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III. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the Lawrences' appeal. Utah Code § 78A-4-
103(2)0). 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter began with a Complaint filed on May 25, 2000 by Cindy Lawrence, Wilma 
Schwenke, Tania Schwenke and Wayne Wong. R. 1. The subject matter of the Complaint 
concerned three new Isuzu Rodeos that Wayne Wong had leased from Intermountain Isuzu less 
than a month before. Plaintiffs stated causes of action for breach of contract, "rescission," and 
"injunction," and sued Intermountain, Bank of America, Isuzu Motors Acceptance Corp., and 
Isuzu LT. All of plaintiffs' causes of action were even* "*l1y dismissed on defendants' motions 
for summary judgment. 
On November 11, 2000, Intermountain filed a separate action, case no. 000909209, 
against A. Paul Schwenke, Wilma Schwenke, and Wayne Wong, which resulted in the issuance 
of a writ of replevin and Intermountain's recovery of one of the three Rodeos Wong had leased, 
which was found in the possession of Paul and Wilma Schwenke in Kanosh, Utah. Case 
000909209 was subsequently consolidated with case no. 000904217. 
In May, 2001, Intermountain, having obtained leave of court to do so, filed an amended 
pleading in which it pleaded causes of action for fraud, conspiracy to defraud, and conversion, 
among other claims, against the four original plaintiffs, Paul Schwenke, and third-party 
defendants Victor Lawrence and cSave.net, LLC. Intermountain finally recovered from 
1 
defendants the remaining two Rodeos but not until 2002, and only after the black Rodeo had 
been totaled in an accident. It was Intermountain's claims and causes of action that were tried to 
the Bench on June 4-8, 2007. Following trial, the Court on August 13, 2007 entered detailed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and a Judgment (R. 2079), in which it found Wayne 
Wong liable to Intermountain for fraud, and Victor and Cindy Lawrence liable for conspiracy to 
defraud. The Court entered a judgment holding Wong, Victor Lawrence, and Cindy Lawrence 
jointly and severally liable to Intermountain for damages in the sum of $80,412.87 caused by 
Wong's fraud, in which the Lawrences conspired. The trial court, in response to Intermountain's 
post-trial motion, amended its judgment for fraud and conspiracy to defraud to include 
prejudgment interest. The damages awarded to Intermountain, and against Wong and the 
Lawrences for fraud and conspiracy to defraud, including prejudgment interest, totaled 
$138,267.25. R. 2160. Judgment entered August 13, 2007 (R. 2079), as amended September 20, 
2007 (R. 2158,2160). 
The trial court, in its Findings and Conclusions, also found Victor and Cindy Lawrence 
liable for conversion, for which Intermountain was awarded damages. The Court also concluded 
that punitive damages against Wong, Victor Lawrence, and Cindy Lawrence were warranted. 
The Court, in compliance with Utah Code § 18-1-1, scheduled a second trial for the 
purpose of determining the amount of punitive damages to be awarded. That trial was held 
March 10 and 11, 2008. The Court, on June 25, 2008, entered detailed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law concerning punitive damages, and awarded to Intermountain a judgment for 
2 
punitive damages as follows: against Wayne Wong, $138,267.25; against Victor Lawrence, 
$484,000; and against Cindy Lawrence, $99,999.99. R. 2498-2542. 
Victor and Cindy Lawrence appeal from the trial court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Judgments entered following the two trials. Wayne Wong did not appeal. 
V. HISTORY OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Intermountain, Inc., at the time this matter was tried, was a licenced motor 
vehicle dealer and Isuzu franchisee with its principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (hereafter "Findings and Conclusions"), f2 (R. 
2080). 
2. Victor Lawrence is an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Utah. Victor 
Lawrence and Cindy Lawrence were married at the time the events giving rise to this litigation 
took place, but have since divorced. Findings and Conclusions, f 3 (R. 2080). 
3. A. Paul Schwenke was a business client of Victor Lawrence who established a 
business entity named cSave.net, LLC on November 4, 1999. Mr. Lawrence prepared the Articles 
of Organization and Operating Agreement for cSave.net. According to the Articles of 
Organization, Wayne Wong was listed as a managing member of the LLC, although he testified 
that all he did for cSave.net was to "input information into the computer." Findings and 
Conclusions, [^4 (R. 2080). A. Paul Schwenke is a disbarred former attorney. 
4. cSave.net's intended business objective was to operate an online grocery shopping 
business. According to Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Wong's testimony, however, cSave.net never 
3 
operated in that capacity. The evidence showed that cSave.net never had significant assets nor 
good credit. Findings and Conclusions, | 5 (R. 2080). 
5. Intermountain Trial Exhibit 24 discloses that in early February, 2000, First 
Security Bank repossessed at least three vehicles in the possession of Victor and Cindy 
Lawrence, and Paul and Wilma Schwenke, which Bonneville Investment Group, LLC had leased 
from West Valley Dodge in late 1998. Exhibit 24 is a Complaint filed on March 31, 2000, one 
day before Wayne Wong leased three new Isuzu Rodeos from Intermountain. Cindy Lawrence 
was one of multiple plaintiffs named by the Complaint, and stated a claim against First Security 
Bank for "breach of the peace" and "unlawful repossession," for which she sought $250,000 in 
damages. Complaint, Int. Trial Exh. 24 at 12-15. She also sought $400,000 in punitive damages. 
Cindy Lawrence, Wilma Schwenke, A. Paul Schwenke, and others were represented on the 
pleading by attorneys Victor Lawrence and Jamis Johnson. The exhibit specifically discloses that 
a green Durango, in the possession of Cindy Lawrence, and parked outside her home, was 
repossessed on February 8, 2000. Exhibit 24 at 13, f 70; see also Findings and Conclusions, If 40-
43 (R. 2086). On February 7, 2000, the day before, First Security Bank repossessed a blue 
Durango that was in the possession of Wilma and Paul Schwenke. Int. Exh. 24 at 7, f 38. 
6. About March 2000, Paul Schwenke, prompted by the loss of the Durangos, 
determined to lease certain vehicles for personal use by his wife Wilma and his daughter Tania. 
According to Mr. Lawrence, Mr. Schwenke also intended to lease a vehicle for Mr. and Ms. 
Lawrence's personal use as partial payment for legal services provided by Mr. Lawrence. See 
Findings and Conclusions, f 6 (R. 2080). 
4 
7. In March, 2000, approximately one month after their West Valley Dodge vehicles 
had been repossessed, Schwenke and Victor Lawrence negotiated the lease of three new Isuzu 
Rodeos (black, silver and green) from Intermountain. Findings and Conclusions, ff 7-8 (R. 2080-
2081). 
8. Mr. Schwenke's contact with Intermountain was ostensibly on behalf of 
cSave.net, presumably as the prospective lessee. However, the negotiated leases were not signed 
on behalfofcSave.net. Instead, they were signed by Wayne Wong, who was presented to 
Intermountain as being the owner and manager ofcSave.net. See Findings and Conclusions, 1J8 
(R. 2080). 
9. Although Mr. Schwenke appeared to have controlled most of the negotiations 
with Intermountain, the Court found that Mr. and Ms. Lawrence also were involved in the lease 
negotiations-at least to the extent that both were aware that the monthly payments on each 
vehicle were supposed to be approximately $360. Findings and Conclusions, |12 (R. 2081). 
10. Mr. Lawrence issued a personal check to Intermountain in the amount of $3000, 
which covered $1000 cash down for each of the three vehicles. Mr. Lawrence claimed he was 
subsequently reimbursed for that expenditure, although the source of the reimbursement was not 
made clear at trial. Findings and Conclusions, [^12. (R. 2081). 
11. The three original plaintiffs other than Wayne Wong (Cindy Lawrence, Wilma 
Schwenke and Tania Schwenke) and also Victor Lawrence and Paul Schwenke, promised to pay 
Wong $10,000 if he would use his credit-worthiness and sign the leases for the vehicles that the 
Schwenkes and Lawrences desired to obtain. Findings and Conclusions, | 9 (R. 2081); Complaint 
5 
at [^41 (R.1 and Int. Trial Exh. 31); Answer, Second Counterclaim and Second Third Party 
Complaint, at 13, f37 (R. 738, 750). 
12. Accepting the Schwenkes' and the Lawrences' offer to pay him $10,000, Wong 
signed leases for the three new Isuzu Rodeos. Int. Trial Exhibits 1 (for black Rodeo), 4 (green 
Rodeo), and 7 (silver Rodeo). Mr. Wong personally signed each of the three leases as the lessee, 
with no present intention to make the lease payments on any of the three vehicles, as they became 
due. Findings and Conclusions, f1fl3, 14 (R. 2081-2082). Although he signed the lease 
agreements in his personal capacity, Wong testified he did not intend to make the monthly lease 
payments. Tr. 141:23-142:5 (6/04/07). Wong said he understood that "the people [who were] 
going to use the vehicles [would] be responsible for paying the payments and insurance and 
everything else." Tr. 142:2-11 (6/04/07). 
13. Neither Mr. Schwenke, nor any of the original plaintiffs, including Mr. Wong, 
disclosed to Intermountain that plaintiffs were paying Mr. Wong $10,000.00 in exchange for his 
signature on the leases. Tr. 144:17-145:4 (6/04/07). Tom Watkins, owner and general manager of 
Intermountain, testified that had Intermountain been aware of this fact, it would not have leased 
the vehicles to Mr. Wong. Findings and Conclusions, [^10 (R. 2081). 
14. Wong also did not disclose to Intermountain that he had no intention to make the 
lease payments as they came due. Tr. 145:5-12 (6/04/07). 
15. Also in connection with the signing of the leases, Mr. Wong signed a commitment 
to maintain insurance on the leased vehicles, and provided Intermountain his automobile 
insurance information and policy number with Hartford Insurance Company. At some point in 
6 
the next several months, however, Mr. Wong allowed his insurance coverage on each of the three 
leased vehicles to lapse. Findings and Conclusions, f 18 (R. 2083). 
16. Wong did not disclose to Intermountain that he intended to let his insurance on 
the three Rodeos lapse shortly after he signed the lease agreements. 
17. Following Mr. Wong's signing of the leases, Wilma Schwenke, Tania Schwenke, 
and Cindy Lawrence took possession of the vehicles. Paul Schwenke and Wilma took possession 
of the silver Rodeo, Tania took possession of the green Rodeo, and Victor and Cindy Lawrence 
took possession of the black Rodeo. Findings and Conclusions, f 19 (R. 2083). 
18. After signing the leases for the three new Rodeos, Wong never again saw any of 
them. Tr. 145:17-146:1 (6/04/07). He also was not told, and thus did not know who had 
possession of and was using the three vehicles. Tr. 145:24-146:15 (6/04/07). Wong was curious 
to know who was using the vehicles, but he never asked. Tr. 146:16-22; 150:20-151:2 (6/04/07). 
19. Intermountain sold the silver and green Rodeos, and lease agreements thereon, to 
Isuzu Motors Acceptance Corporation and Isuzu LT. Intermountain sold the black Rodeo, and 
the lease thereon to Bank of America. Findings and Conclusions, }^20 (R. 2083). 
20. None of the plaintiffs made any monthly lease payments whatsoever on any of the 
three vehicles. Neither did Mr. Schwenke, cSave.net, nor Mr. Lawrence make any payments. 
Findings and Conclusions, |21 (R. 2083). 
21. A Verified Complaint was filed in this action on May 25, 2000. R. 1. Plaintiffs 
were at the time represented by attorney Jamis A. Johnson, who has since been disbarred. The 
Complaint was verified under oath by disbarred and since convicted felon, A. Paul Schwenke. 
7 
Attorney Victor Lawrence, Cindy Lawrence's husband, notarized Paul Schwenke's signature on 
the Complaint. Plaintiffs alleged breach of contract and sought to enjoin lessors from enforcing 
the terms of three lease agreements. Plaintiffs did not however, return or offer to return the three 
leased Rodeos, nor did they tender monthly payments as they became due. 
22. Beginning in May 2000 and thereafter each month for several months, Mr. Wong 
received multiple notices from Bank of America that lease payments on the black Rodeo were 
due, and that late fees were accruing. See Int. Trial Exh. 20. As he did with demand letters he 
received concerning the silver and green Rodeos, Mr. Wong ignored the Bank of America notices 
and turned them over to Mr. Schwenke. Mr. Wong did not inquire into who had possession of the 
Black Rodeo, nor did he make any of the payments as demanded. Findings and Conclusions, Tf24 
(R. 2084). 
23. Intermountain answered the Complaint on June 26, 2000. R. 29. 
24. On September 26, 2000, the Court granted Intermountain's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment (R. 70), in which the Isuzu defendants joined (R.122). The Order and 
Judgment (R. 153) dismissed with prejudice the claims and causes of action originally pleaded by 
Cindy Lawrence, Wilma Schwenke and Tania Schwenke against Intermountain and the Isuzu 
defendants. The Court did not, though, dismiss Wong's claims and causes of action. 
25. In October, 2000, Intermountain repurchased from the Isuzu defendants the silver 
and green Rodeos and the corresponding lease contracts, as the lease agreements were in default. 
Findings and Conclusions, f23 (R. 2083). 
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26. On November 13, 2000, Intermountain, which at the time was only a defendant in 
this action, filed a separate action (case #000909209), as a plaintiff, to recover the silver Rodeo 
which, Intermountain had learned, was in the possession of Paul and Wilma Schwenke at their 
home in Kanosh, Utah. Intermountain's Complaint in case No. 000909209, R. 393-396, named 
Paul Schwenke, Wilma Schwenke, and Wayne Wong as defendants and alleged that 
Intermountain was entitled to recover the silver Rodeo. The Court (Medley, J.) issued a 
prejudgment writ of replevin, the issuance of which was later affirmed after a hearing demanded 
by Schwenke. R. 209. 
27. In November 2000, pursuant to the Writ of Replevin issued by the Court, a sheriff 
repossessed the silver Rodeo from Paul and Wilma Schwenke's residence in Kanosh, Utah. On 
repossession of the vehicle, Intermountain learned that the silver Rodeo had been in an accident 
and sustained substantial damage. Intermountain repaired the damage and later sold the silver 
Rodeo to a retail customer for $13,898.00. Findings and Conclusions, [^27 (R. 2084); see also Int. 
Trial Exhibits 47-55. 
28. On December 6, 2000, Bryan Fishburn entered an appearance on behalf of Isuzu 
Motors Acceptance Corp. and Isuzu LT, as well as Intermountain. R. 220. 
29. On December 12, 2000, Bank of America answered the original Complaint, and 
counterclaimed against Wong. R. 228. 
30. On January 3, 2001, the court (Henriod, J.) entered an Order Compelling Answers 
to Interrogatories, which commanded Cindy Lawrence, A. Paul Schwenke, Wilma Schwenke and 
Wayne Wong each to answer Interrogatories, under oath, that Intermountain had previously 
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served on them. It would be almost a year before Cindy Lawrence and Mr. and Mrs. Schwenke 
answered the Interrogatories, and then only after they had been found and held to be in contempt 
of court. 
31. By Order entered on January 30, 2001, R. 355, the trial court (Henriod, J.) ordered 
that case no. 000909209 be consolidated with this case, no. 000904217. R. 355. 
32. Because no monthly lease payments had been made on the black Rodeo during the 
first ten months of the lease term, Bank of America required Intermountain to repurchase the 
lease and the black Rodeo at a cost of $35,278.24. Findings and Conclusions, ^25 (R. 2084); Int. 
Trial Exhibits 61 and 62. 
33. On January 31, 2001, Bryan Fishburn entered an appearance for Bank of America. 
R. 358. 
34. Also on January 31, 2001, on the same day Intermountain regained ownership of 
the black Rodeo, Intermountain unsuccessfully attempted to repossess it while in a parking 
garage adjacent to Mr. Lawrence's law office at the Lexington Law Firm in Salt Lake City. Mr. 
Watkins was present at the attempted repossession. A confrontation between Mr. Watkins and 
Mr. Lawrence ensued, and police were called to the scene. Findings and Conclusions, Tf28 (R. 
2084). 
35. After having returned to the parking garage from his office and seeing that 
someone was in the process of taking possession of the black Rodeo, Victor Lawrence "without 
cause or justification . . . attacked Watkins by seizing him and grabbing his head in a headlock. 
During this altercation, Watkins suffered injuries to the head as a consequence of the attack by 
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Lawrence." See Int. Trial Exh. 106 (Findings of Fact made by Third Dist. Court, Judge Iwasaki, 
Feb. 8, 2008 in Lawrence v. Intermountain, case no. 020906142, Addendum "A" hereto; see also 
Supp. Findings and Conclusions, 1fl at 2-3 (R.2499-2500)). 
36. When police arrived on the scene, Watkins showed them and Lawrence 
documentation evidencing Intermountain's reacquired rights over the black Rodeo. Mr. 
Lawrence nonetheless said he would not turn over the vehicle without a court order. The police 
allowed Mr. Lawrence to leave the scene with the black Rodeo. Findings and Conclusions, Tf28 
(R. 2084). 
37. Immediately after the attempted repossession, Mr. Lawrence turned the black 
Rodeo over to Mr. Schwenke, notwithstanding Mr. Lawrence's knowledge that Intermountain 
was claiming ownership of the black Rodeo. Upon receiving possession of the Black Rodeo, Mr. 
Schwenke gave permission to a family member to drive the black Rodeo to California, where it 
was subsequently totaled in a single vehicle accident. Findings and Conclusions, TJ29 (R. 2084). 
38. On February 6, 2001, the Court (Henriod, J.), over Wong's objection, and 
following a hearing, ordered the Millard County Sheriff to release the silver Rodeo to 
Intermountain. Minute Entry, R. 367; Order to Millard County Sheriff, R. 368. According to the 
Court's Minutes, Jamis Johnson appeared at the hearing on behalf of the Schwenkes and Wayne 
Wong. 
39. Following the hearing on February 6, 2001, the Court authorized the withdrawal 
of Jamis Johnson as counsel for Wayne Wong, Cindy Lawrence, and Wilma, Tania and Paul 
Schwenke. R. 486. 
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40. On May 7, 2001, having obtained leave of court to do so, R. 523, Intermountain 
filed an amended pleading, which it titled "First Amended Answer, Counterclaim, and Third 
Party Complaint." R. 526. In the course of its amended pleading, it pleaded causes of action 
and sought damages against the original plaintiffs, as well as against A. Paul Schwenke and third 
party defendant Victor Lawrence, for fraud, conspiracy to defraud, conversion, and unjust 
enrichment; and against Wong for breach of contract. R. 526, 534-541. Intermountain's 
Amended Answer and Counterclaim gave the opposing parties notice of its acquisition of Bank 
of America's and Isuzu's contracts and rights, and the vehicles, ffl[37 and 39 (R. 533), and was 
served by mail on Cindy Lawrence, Wayne Wong, Paul Schwenke, and Wilma Schwenke, at 
their residential addresses, R. 543, as Jamis Johnson had withdrawn as their attorney. This 
pleading also joined Victor Lawrence, and cSave.net, LLC, which Wayne Wong supposedly 
managed, as third party defendants. Victor Lawrence was personally served with process. 
41. On May 23, 2001, because Intermountain still did not know who had possession 
of the green and black Rodeos, Intermountain served Interrogatories and Requests for Production 
of Documents on the Schwenkes, Mr. and Ms. Lawrence, and Mr. Wong, to discover the location 
of those vehicles. Findings and Conclusions, TJ30 (R. 2084). 
42. Despite the obvious conflict of interest created by the fact that he was now a 
defendant and alleged to have conspired with Wong, Schwenke and other parties, Victor 
Lawrence, on June 4, 2001, entered an appearance on behalf of all parties adverse to 
Intermountain, including himself. R. 717. Wong testified at trial that he did not know that 
Lawrence had entered an appearance on his behalf. He did not authorize Lawrence to appear on 
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his behalf. And he did not waive potential conflicts of interest in connection with Lawrence's 
representation of Wong, others, and himself. Wong, Tr. 161:16-162:20 (6/04/07). Although 
Lawrence, apparently on his own and, initially at least, without Wong's knowledge or consent, 
entered an appearance on Wong's behalf, he did not disclose to Wong that he and his wife, 
Cindy, had possessed and used the black Rodeo through January 31, 2001. Tr. 163:6-9 (6/04/07). 
43. Victor Lawrence, on June 5, 2001, filed, on his behalf and on behalf of all parties 
adverse to Intermountain, a pleading in response to the amended pleading that Intermountain had 
filed on May 7, 2001. Lawrence, et al., called their responsive pleading an "Answer, Second 
Counterclaim, and Second Third-Party Complaint." R. 738-765. 
44. On June 13, 2001, the Lawrences, Schwenkes and Wong notified the Third 
District Court that they had removed the case to the United States District Court. R. 766, 812. 
Wong testified at trial that no one told him the action has been removed to federal court, and at 
the time he was not aware that Victor Lawrence was acting as his attorney. Tr. 164:6-13 
(6/04/07). 
45. The underlying case languished in federal court until September 2001, when the 
federal court remanded the case because it lacked removal jurisdiction. Order of Remand (R. 
799). The United States District Court assessed sanctions in the sum of $1,500.00 against those 
who had removed the case. 
46. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Intermountain, Inc., as 
assignee of Bank of America's rights, against Wayne Wong, for breach of his contract/lease 
agreement on the black Rodeo. This judgment, entered September 21, 2001, awarded 
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Intermountain damages against Wong in the sum of $32,852.29 plus costs of court in the sum of 
$613.40. Order Granting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (R. 786). Although 
represented still at the time by Victor Lawrence, Wong testified that no one, at the time, informed 
him that a judgment had been entered against him. Tr. 168:6-169:4 (6/04/07). This judgment 
debt, for breach of contract, was subsequently discharged in the course of a bankruptcy case that 
Wong filed in 2003. 
47. As part of the Order entered on September 21, 2001, the Court, in addition to 
entering partial summary judgment in favor of Intermountain against Wong for breach of 
contract, decreed and ordered as follows: 
4. Intermountain is entitled to immediate possession of the 
black Rodeo, VIN 4S2DM58W7Y4302440. 
5. None of the other parties in this action other than 
Intermountain are entitled to possession of the black Rodeo. 
Each, including all parties other than Wong, is ordered to deliver 
the black Rodeo to Intermountain immediately and without further 
delay, if in his/her possession or under his/her control. Wong was 
in default and not entitled to continued possession once he 
missed his first lease payment. None of the other parties who 
have aligned themselves with Wong were at any time entitled 
to continued use and possession of the black Rodeo without 
permission of the lessor, which according to the undisputed 
material facts before this Court was never sought or obtained. 
R. 786, 788 (Henriod, J.) (emphasis added). The Court, on January 7, 2002, entered an Order 
which included similar language regarding the green Rodeo. R. 1099, 1101. 
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48. As part of an Order entered on January 7, 2002, the Court entered summary 
judgment in favor of Isuzu Motors Corporation and Isuzu LT, and dismissing with prejudice all 
claims Wong and the other original plaintiffs had alleged against them. R. 1099, 1102. 
49. The Court (Henriod, J.) issued a Writ and Order of Replevin on the black Rodeo 
on October 5, 2001 and a Writ and Order of Replevin on the green Rodeo on January 10, 2002. 
Neither Order of Replevin resulted in the immediate return of the black and green Rodeos, 
however. Only after the Court entered an Order on February 26, 2006 finding the parties in 
contempt of court, did they finally answer the Interrogatories intended to ascertain the location of 
the black and green Rodeos. Findings and Conclusions, f 32 (R. 2085). 
50. On or about March 11, 2002, Mr. Schwenke finally returned the green Rodeo to 
Intermountain, at which time Intermountain discovered that it had also sustained substantial 
damage. Intermountain sold the green Rodeo at auction a few months later for $8,310.08, after 
attempting but being unable to sell it on the retail market. Findings and Conclusions, [^33 (R. 
2085). 
51. When Mr. Schwenke finally returned the black Rodeo, in 2002, it was delivered to 
Intermountain on a flatbed truck having been totaled in an accident in California. Intermountain 
unsuccessfully attempted to sell what was left of the black Rodeo to a wholesaler, but ended up 
selling the vehicle to one of its employees for $1,200.00. Findings and Conclusions, |34 (R. 
2085). 
52. After repurchasing the three Rodeos and the leases from Bank of America and 
Isuzu Motors Acceptance Corporation/Isuzu LT for $95,752.45, incurring approximately 
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$8,000.00 in expenses (not including attorneys fees) in recovering and preparing the vehicles for 
sale, and reselling the three vehicles for $23,408.98, Intermountain was left with a net loss of 
$80,412.87. Findings and Conclusions, f 35 (R. 2085); see also Int. Trial Exh. 66. 
53. Victor and Cindy Lawrence on May 15, 2002, moved for summary judgment, by 
which they sought to have all claims pleaded against them by Intermountain dismissed as a 
matter of law. Their motion was eventually denied, with the exception that the courl - on the 
basis of the Lawrences' argument - dismissed without prejudice Intermountain's equitable claim 
for unjust enrichment. R. 1555. 
54. On July 8, 2002, Victor Lawrence filed a separate civil action against 
Intermountain and Tom Watkins, in which he sought damages for Watkins' alleged assault and 
battery against him in connection with Intermountain's and Watkins' failed effort to take 
possession of the black Rodeo on January 31, 2001. Lawrence v. Intermountain, Inc. and G. 
Thomas Watkins, Third Dist. Court, case no. 020906142 (Iwasaki, J.). Watkins counterclaimed 
against Lawrence for assault and battery. 
55. In November, 2002, Wong and Wilma Schwenke filed an appeal, alleging various 
errors committed by the trial court. Appeal No. 20021027-CA. The appeal was dismissed 
because no final judgment had been entered. 
56. A few days following the dismissal of Wong's appeal and Remittitur issued 
September 9, 2003, Wong, on September 18, 2003, filed with the United States Bankruptcy 
Court a petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. Representing 
himself, Wong did not list Intermountain, Inc. as a creditor; thus Intermountain was not notified 
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and did not learn of Wong's bankruptcy filing until too late to file a nondischargeability action 
under 11 U.S.C. §§523(a)(2)(A) and 523(c). 
57. Having finally discovered that Wong had filed bankruptcy in September, 2003, 
and having researched the issue of its rights as "an omitted creditor," Intermountain, in June, 
2005, sought and obtained leave to amend its May, 2001 pleading in order to add a fraud based 
cause of action against Wong pursuant to federal law, 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(3)(B). 
58. The Schwenkes failed to appear personally or through counsel at a pretrial 
conference held on August 14, 2006 and, also, at a rescheduled pretrial conference held 
November 27, 2006. As a consequence, their default was certified and a default judgment was 
entered against them. Order Striking Pleadings and Entry of Default Judgment, entered March 2, 
2007 (R. 1946). 
59. Intermountain's claims and causes of action were finally tried to the Bench on 
June 4-8, 2007 (Lindberg, J.). Intermountain tried its claims against three defendants: Wayne 
Wong, Victor Lawrence, and Cindy Lawrence. 
60. On August 13, 2007, the trial court entered detailed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. It also entered Judgment in favor of Intermountain, against Victor 
Lawrence, Cindy Lawrence, and Wayne Wong. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
Judgment, and Order (R. 2079). 
61. The Judgment entered on August 13, 2007, held that "Wayne Wong, Victor 
Lawrence and Cindy Lawrence are jointly and severally liable to Intermountain for fraud or 
conspiracy to defraud in the amount of $80,412.87." R. 2094. 
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62. The Judgment also found Victor and Cindy Lawrence "jointly and severally liable 
to Intermountain for conversion of the black Rodeo." R. 2094. It found that Victor and Cindy 
Lawrence were jointly and severally liable to Intermountain for damages "in the amount of 
$3,625.40 (representing fair rental value of the black Rodeo from April 1, 2000 to January 31, 
2001 at $362.54 per month . . . ) ; but found Victor Lawrence "separately liable to Intermountain 
for his conversion of the black Rodeo in the amount of $34,284.20 (representing Intermountain's 
cost to recover and repurchase the black Rodeo) less the $1,200.00 it received by selling i t . . . . " 
R. 2094. 
63. By Minute Entry and Order dated September 20, 2007, the Court granted 
Intermountain's Motion to Amend the Judgment entered on August 13, 2007, to include 
prejudgment interest. R. 2158. 
Thus, the Court finds that the Defendants should be held jointly and severally 
liable for fraud or conspiracy to defraud in the amount of $80,412.87 plus 
prejudgment interest in the amount of $57,854.38. 
R. 2160. The judgment against Wayne Wong, Victor Lawrence, and Cindy Lawrence, as 
amended, thus totaled $138,267.25 as August 13, 2007, the date on which judgment was entered. 
64. On January 16, 2008, the claims in the Lawrence v. Intermountain/Watkins case 
were tried to the Bench, with Judge Iwasaki presiding over the trial.1 Victor Lawrence's claims 
against Watkins for assault and battery were dismissed with prejudice. The trial found in favor of 
Watkins on Watkins' counterclaim against Lawrence for assault and battery, but awarded 
1
 Intermountain and Tom Watkins were represented by attorney Wynn Bartholomew. 
Victor Lawrence was represented by attorney Blake Atkin. 
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Watkins nominal damages ($10) because Watkins did not introduce any medical bills into 
evidence. The court, Judge Iwasaki, made the following findings of fact: 
3. On or about March 31, 2000, Wayne Wong entered into a written lease 
agreement to lease a black Isuzu Rodeo (hereinafter the "vehicle"), VIN 
452DM58W7Y4302440, from Intermountain, Even though others may 
have negotiated and taken actual possession of said vehicle, the vehicle 
was leased to Wayne Wong. 
4. Pursuant to said lease agreement, Wayne Wong did not have authority to 
sublease or grant permission to anyone except on a temporary basis to use said 
vehicle without the express permission of Lessor. 
5. Although Lawrence testified that he and his family had permission to use said 
vehicle, his testimony was not credible. There was no credible evidence that 
Lawrence, or his family, ever had permission to use the vehicle. 
6. Wayne Wong was obligated by the lease agreement to make monthly lease 
payments to Lessor in the amount of $364.52. Neither Wong nor Lawrence, nor 
anyone else acting on their behalf, ever made any monthly lease payment on said 
vehicle. 
7. As a result, said written agreement was in default and the vehicle became 
subject to repossession by the Lessor. 
8. Intermountain bought the vehicle back from Bank of America on January 31, 
2001, and had authority to repossess said vehicle as Lessor on that date. 
9. Later on or about January 31, 2001, said vehicle was located by Watkins in a 
parking garage located in Salt Lake City, State of Utah. 
10. Watkins and Duane Smith of Noorda Towing attempted to repossess said 
vehicle from the parking garage. Prior to attempting to repossess said vehicle, 
Watkins called Salt Lake City Police Department and attempted to notify them of 
his intent to repossess. 
11. Said vehicle was secured by a lockbar owned by Lawrence immobilizing the 
steering wheel of said vehicle. 
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12. Access to the vehicle was gained by a duplicate key make by Watkins. 
Watkins and Duane Smith were attempting to saw through the cylinder of said 
lockbar with a hacksaw when they were approached by Lawrence. 
13. Lawrence asked Watkins and his agent what they were doing in the vehicle. 
14. Lawrence entered the vehicle and seized personal property of Duane Smith 
and refused to return said personal property. Lawrence asked Watkins and his 
agent to leave the vehicle, which they did. 
15. Thereafter, Watkins attempted to retrieve Duane Smith's tools from the 
vehicle. Without cause or justification, Lawrence attacked Watkins by seizing him 
and grabbing his head in a headlock. During this altercation, Watkins' head and 
neck were injured, causing a cut to his head and bruise to the neck. 
16. Watkins suffered injuries to the head as a consequence of the 
attack by Lawrence. 
Int. Trial Exh. 106 (emphasis added). A copy of the above Findings of Fact is attached hereto at 
Addendum "A." 
65. A second trial in this case was conducted on March 10 and 11, 2008, the purpose 
of which was to determine the amount of punitive damages to be assessed against Victor 
Lawrence, Cindy Lawrence, and Wayne Wong. 
66. The findings of fact made by Judge Iwasaki were received in evidence during the 
course of the second trial on punitive damages. The trial court in this case (Judge Lindberg) 
considered Judge Jwasaki's findings in determining the amount of punitive damages to be 
assessed against Victor Lawrence. Supp. Findings and Conclusions at 2-3, 30 (R. 2499, 2500, 
2527). 
67. Following the trial on punitive damages, the trial court, on June 25, 2008, entered 
its "Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment." R. 2498-2542. 
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68. The trial court awarded Intermountain punitive damages against the remaining 
defendants, in the following amounts: against Victor Lawrence, in the sum of $484,000.00; 
against Cindy Lawrence, in the sum of $99,999.99; and against Wayne Wong, in the sum of 
$138,267.25. R. 2541-2542. 
69. The court made detailed Findings and carefully explained why it concluded the 
preceding sums were appropriate as punitive damages. R. 2498-2552. 
VI. SUMMARY OF APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT 
1. The Court did not err in finding and holding Victor and Cindy Lawrence liable for 
conspiracy to defraud. A person need not, as the Lawrences contend, have personally 
misrepresented material facts to a third person, on which it relied to its detriment, in order to be 
held liable for conspiracy to defraud. The Lawrences do not marshal the evidence that supports 
the trial court's findings of fact on conspiracy to defraud. The evidence supported the court's 
findings and conclusions that Victor and Cindy Lawrence conspired with the Schwenkes and 
Wayne Wong to defraud Intermountain. 
2. The Court did not err in finding that Cindy Lawrence had knowledge of an agreement 
to pay Wayne Wong $10,000, and knowledge of the conspiracy to defraud Intermountain, based 
in part on a judicial admission in a Complaint, which named her as one of the plaintiffs. As a 
plaintiff, Cindy Lawrence is bound to statements of fact, or admissions, in her pleadings. She 
might have distanced herself from the judicial admission in her Complaint had she timely moved 
to amend her Complaint, but she did not try until it was too late. Moreover, Cindy Lawrence 
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ratified the Complaint, as hers, when deposed on March 20, 2002. Intermountain, at trial, 
proved the elements of a civil conspiracy against Victor and Cindy Lawrence. 
3. The Court did not err in finding and holding that Victor Lawrence conspired with 
others to defraud Intermountain in part, but only in part, based on his marriage to Cindy 
Lawrence, who the Court concluded knew of the inducement promised to Wayne Wong if he 
would sign, in his personal capacity, to lease vehicles that were really intended for the 
Lawrences' and the Schwenkes' personal use. Moreover, Victor Lawrence, in the Answer he 
prepared as attorney on behalf of the other parties and himself, alleged in a pleading that "Victor 
Lawrence and A. Paul Schwenke agreed to pay Wayne Wong $10,000." 
4. The Court did not err in finding and holding Victor and Cindy Lawrence liable for 
conversion of the black Rodeo. Bank of America owned the black Rodeo until January 31, 2001, 
at which time it conveyed ownership of the black Rodeo and assigned to Intermountain all its 
rights with regard to the black Rodeo, including implicitly any claim Bank of America had for 
conversion. Intermountain, as assignee of Bank of America's rights, proved the elements of 
conversion. 
To Intermountain's recollection, the Lawrences did not, at trial, argue that Intermountain 
lacked standing to plead a cause of action for conversion because the chose-in-action was still 
held by Bank of America. By failing to plead lack of standing as an affirmative defense, the 
Lawrences waived that defense. 
The trial court was justified in finding that Victor Lawrence was liable for more damages 
for conversion of the black Rodeo, than was Cindy Lawrence. 
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5. The evidence at trial and the trial court's findings and conclusions that Victor and 
Cindy Lawrence conspired to defraud Intermountain, and that they were liable for conversion of 
the black Rodeo, support the court's conclusion that an award of punitive damages against both 
Victor and Cindy Lawrence was warranted. The court followed Utah law in arriving at its 
decision, and in determining what sums were appropriate to award as punitive damages. 
6. The punitive damages that the court awarded against Victor Lawrence and against 
Cindy Lawrence did not violate either of the Lawrences' constitutional rights, and were not 
excessive. 
VII. APPELLEE'S ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL 
1. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT VICTOR 
LAWRENCE AND CINDY LAWRENCE CONSPIRED WITH WAYNE WONG 
AND THE SCHWENKES TO DEFRAUD INTERMOUNTAIN. 
The trial court found that both Victor Lawrence and Cindy Lawrence participated in a 
conspiracy to defraud Intermountain, by which they directly benefitted by securing for their 
personal use a new black Isuzu Rodeo, which they drove for approximately ten months without 
making any payments for its use. The trial court correctly defined the tort of conspiracy to 
defraud, and correctly noted that liability for conspiracy to defraud must be proven by clear and 
convincing evidence, citing Crane Co. v. Dahle. 576 P.2d 870, 872 (Utah 1978). Findings and 
Conclusions, f 46 (R. 2087). The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Wayne 
Wong defrauded Intermountain. Findings and Conclusions, f^f 54-55 (R. 2089). It also found, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that Victor Lawrence and Cindy Lawrence conspired with 
Wayne Wong and the Schwenkes to defraud Intermountain, for which it held Wong and the 
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Lawrences liable in damages. Id., 1fl[62, 65 (R. 2092). The trial court found that the damages 
caused to Intermountain by the fraud perpetrated by Wayne Wong, with whom the Lawrences 
and Schwenkes conspired, was $80,412.87, not including prejudgment interest. Id., t |35 , 69 (R. 
2085, 2094). With prejudgment interest, the damages caused as a result of the fraud, in which 
the Lawrences conspired, amounted to $138,267.15 as of August 13, 2007, the date on which the 
trial court entered judgment for compensatory damages in favor of Intermountain, against the 
Lawrences. See Minute Entry and Order (09/20/2007), R. 2158, 2168 (granting Intermountain's 
motion to amend judgment, to include prejudgment interest). 
A. Elements Required to Prove Conspiracy to Defraud. 
Persons who participate jointly in a fraud may be held jointly liable for damages caused 
by the fraud. Schwartz v. Tanner, 576 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1978). In order to prove civil 
conspiracy, generally, a plaintiff must establish the following elements: (1) a combination of 
two or more persons, (2) an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on the object 
or course of action, (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximate result 
thereof. Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah App. 1987). 
A person can be held liable in damages under Utah law for conspiring with another 
person to defraud a third person. See DeBrv v. Cascade Construction Co., 879 P.2d 1353, 1359 
(Utah 1994). A conspiracy to defraud is a fraud committed by two or more persons who share an 
intent to defraud another. Id. A conspiracy to defraud "may be inferred from circumstantial 
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evidence, including the nature of the act done, the relations of the parties, and the interests of the 
alleged conspirators." Israel Pagan, 791.2 
B. Victor and Cindy Lawrence Fail to Marshal the Facts and Argument that 
Support the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusion that the 
Lawrences were Liable to Intermountain for Conspiracy to Defraud. 
A court's determination that a party before it has participated in a conspiracy to defraud 
involves a mixed question of fact and law. Whether the trial court applied the correct standard 
and burden of proof in determining that a party is liable for conspiracy to defraud is a question of 
law, and should be reviewed for correctness. Findings of fact that concern actions and events, 
conduct, statements, relationships, and other circumstantial evidence that support a trial court's 
conclusion that parties before it conspired to defraud a third person should be reviewed as factual 
determinations. 
Findings of fact by a trial court are not to be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 52. "Where a trial court's rulings on highly fact-dependent issues are challenged, the 
Supreme Court grants broader than normal discretion to the trial court." Chen v. Stewart. 2004 
UT 82, f76, 100 P.3d 1177. In order to challenge the Court's factual findings which it stated as 
supporting its conclusion that Victor and Cindy Lawrence conspired to defraud Intermountain, 
Mr. and Mrs. Lawrence, in the course of their appeal, should "first marshal all of the evidence in 
support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the 
finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below." Wilson Supply, Inc. 
2The Utah Supreme Court added that conspiracy, however, "cannot be established by 
conjecture and speculation alone." Israel Pagan, 791. 
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v. Fradan Mfg. Co., 2002 UT 94, 121, 54 P.3d 1177. The Utah Court of Appeals recently 
explained that "in order to properly discharge the debt of marshaling the evidence, the challenger 
must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of evidence introduced at trial 
which supports the very findings the appellant resists." Neelv v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, 
111, 51 P.3d 724 (cited with approval by Utah Supreme Court in Chen, at 177). The process of 
marshaling, which is admittedly a counter-intuitive task, requires that the challenger "temporarily 
remove its own prejudices and fully embrace the adversary's position"; and he or she must play 
the "devil's advocate." Chen, 178. "In so doing, appellants must present the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the trial court . . . and not attempt to construe the evidence in a light favorable 
to their case." Id. "In sum, to properly marshal the evidence the challenging party must 
demonstrate how the court found the facts from the evidence and then explain why those findings 
contradict the clear weight of the evidence." Id. If the challenger does not comply with the 
marshaling requirement, his or her appeal may be dismissed for that reason alone. Chen, 180; 
Wilson Supply, 126. 
Victor and Cindy Lawrence do not marshal the evidence that supports the trial court's 
findings and conclusion that they both conspired to defraud Intermountain. Instead they pick at 
the Court's findings, choosing to focus on individual facts which, in isolation, they contend 
cannot support the Court's findings and its conclusions that they conspired with Wayne Wong 
and the Schwenkes to defraud Intermountain. 
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C. The Trial Court did not Need to Find that Victor and Cindy Lawrence 
Personally Made to Intermountain one or more Misrepresentations in Order 
for Them to be Found Liable for Conspiracy to Defraud. 
Victor and Cindy Lawrence implicitly concede that the evidence at trial supports the 
court's findings and conclusions that Wayne Wong engaged in fraud, and that he is liable to 
Intermountain for damages caused by his fraud. See also Findings and Conclusions, 119-10, 13, 
17-18, 45, and 54-55 (R. 2081-2083, 2087, 2089). Nonetheless, the Lawrences contend that as 
"the trial court. . . could not find any affirmative misrepresentations made directly by the 
Lawrences to Intermountain," the trial court "for that reason, could not find the Lawrences liable 
for fraud." Appellants' Brief, at 15. According to the Lawrences' interpretation of the law, "In 
order to find the Lawrences liable for conspiracy to defraud, the trial court must find the elements 
of fraud were met with respect to the Lawrences themselves, and not with respect to a co-
defendant." Appellants' Brief, at 20, with citation to DeBry, 1358. According to the 
Lawrences, "If neither Lawrence committed a fraud because, among other elements, they made 
no affirmative misrepresentations, they cannot be found liable for conspiracy to defraud, even if 
Mr. Wong was found to have committed civil fraud." Appellants' Brief, at 20. 
The Lawrences' argument does not accurately state the law. According to the Utah 
Supreme Court, a person, under the appropriate circumstances, may be found liable for damages 
based on intentional misrepresentations made by another person, on which a third person relied 
to his detriment: 
A person cannot be held liable for a fraudulent misrepresentation 
unless he made it himself or authorized another to make it for him 
or in some way participated therein. However, the 
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circumstances may be such as to impose liability for 
representations made by others as where parties jointly 
participate in fraud. Conspiracy is an example thereof but it is 
not essential that a conspiracy existed. 
Schwartz v. Tanner, 576 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1978) (emphasis added). Although the Lawrences 
cite DeBry v. Cascade Enterprises in support of their interpretation of the law, a reading of that 
case indicates that the Utah Supreme Court considered whether Mr. and Mrs. DeBry were liable 
for conspiracy to defraud, having first held that they were not liable for fraud. DeBry, 1358-
1359.3 If the Lawrences' argument correctly states the law, there would be no reason to 
recognize what courts label "secondary fraud claims." See Coroles v. Sabev. 2003 UT App 339, 
111(35-41, 79 P.3d 974. 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979) establishes that a person can be liable for an 
intentional tort committed by another person, under a variety of circumstances. See §§ 875-877. 
For example, § 877 states that: 
For harm resulting from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability 
if he (a) orders or induces the conduct, if he knows or should knowr of 
circumstances that would make the conduct tortious if it were his own. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 877(a) (emphasis added). 
Individuals who conspire with one another to orchestrate and/or carry out a 
fraudulent plan or scheme can be held liable for their conduct. Even if a person 
does not commit a fraudulent act, he or she can be liable for the conspiracy, 
15A CJ.S. Conspiracy § 46 (2002) (emphasis added). 
3
 Under the facts of that case the Utah Supreme Court held that Mr. and Mrs. DeBry could 
not be found liable for conspiracy to defraud. 
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It is true that "secondary fraud claims," which include conspiracy to defraud, require 
proof of an underlying fraud. Coroles, T|36; Gildea v. Guardian Title Co., 970 P.2d 1265, 1271 
(Utah 1998) (affirming dismissal on the pleadings of Gildea's claim for conspiracy to defraud 
because plaintiffs did "not appeal the dismissal of their original fraud claim for failure to plead 
sufficient facts"); see also 15A CJ.S. Conspiracy § 46 (2002). In this case, an underlying fraud 
was proved; committed by Wayne Wong. Although the Lawrences did not personally make 
misrepresentations directly to Intermountain, they participated in the conspiracy by which they 
and the Schwenkes arranged for Wong to lease vehicles, under false pretenses, for their use. 
They knew, the court found, of the promise to pay Wong $10,000 in order to induce him to sign 
leases for three new Isuzu Rodeos, for their and the Schwenkes' use. 
It was not necessary for Intermountain to prove that Victor or Cindy Lawrence directly 
misrepresented material facts to Intermountain, on which it relied to its detriment, for the trial 
court to find each of them liable for conspiracy to defraud. 
D. Intermountain at Trial Proved the Elements of a Civil Conspiracy to 
Commit Fraud. 
Intermountain proved the elements of a civil conspiracy, as Israel Pagan identifies those 
elements: 
1. A combination of two or more persons: Paul and Wilma Schwenke, Victor 
Lawrence, and Cindy Lawrence acting in concert with Wayne Wong. 
29 
2. An object to be accomplished: to obtain three new vehicles for the Schwenkes 
and Lawrences to drive, for free; while inducing Wong to sign lease agreements which imposed 
on him the contractual liability. The trial court found that: 
The goal of the conspiracy to defraud, in this case, 
was to acquire the free use of vehicles from a motor 
vehicle dealer and/or leasing company. Lawrence 
and the others engaged in conduct calculated to 
enable the conspirators to use the vehicles for as 
long as possible, to the extent even of ignoring court 
orders compelling discovery of their location and 
directing that the vehicles be returned to 
Intermountain. 
Supp. Findings and Conclusions at 29 (R. 2526). 
3. A meeting of the minds on the object or course of action: the Lawrences knew 
of and agreed with the object of the plan, as established by circumstantial evidence. Although 
there must be a meeting of minds on the object to be accomplished or course of action, "the 
agreement need not be formal" and "the understanding may be a tacit one." 15A C.J.S. 
Conspiracy § 47 (2002). A conspiracy to defraud, according to the Utah Court of Appeals, can be 
inferred from circumstantial evidence. Israel Pagan, 791. According to the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, "the agreement need not be expressed in words and may be implied and understood 
from the conduct itself." § 876, comment (a) (1979). "Inferences of concerted action may be 
drawn from joint participation in the transactions and from enjoyment of the fruits of the 
transaction." Lesikar v. Rappeport 33 S.W.3d 282, 302 (Tex. App. 2000). Each conspirator 
need not have knowledge of all or even most details of the conspiracy. 15 C.J.S. Conspiracy TJ48 
(2002). 
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4. One or more unlawful overt acts: Wong's misrepresentations to Intermountain 
are the unlawful, overt act. Fraud is an "unlawful act" on which a civil conspiracy, and liability 
therefore may be based. Lesikar, 302. 
5. And damages as a proximate result: Court found damages to be in the sum of 
$80,412.87 plus prejudgment interest. 
E. An Attorney may be Liable for Conspiracy to Defraud 
Throughout his Brief, Victor Lawrence suggests that his privileged status as an attorney 
protects him against a finding that he conspired with other defendants to defraud Intermountain. 
According to Lawrence, he was just representing his clients. 
"An attorney may be liable for conspiracy to defraud if he knowingly agrees with others 
to defraud a third person." Lesikar, 318; see also Celano v. Frederick, 203 N.E.2d 774, 778 (111. 
App. 1964) (holding that an attorney "may not use his license as a shield to protect himself from 
the consequences of his participation in an unlawful or illegal conspiracy"). The trial court found 
that Victor Lawrence conspired with the Schwenkes and Cindy Lawrence, and with Wong, to 
obtain new vehicles for the Lawrences' and Schwenkes' personal use, without intending to pay 
for them. Moreover, there was a strong indication he had engaged in the same scheme with the 
Schwenkes before, although Wong was not involved in the earlier case. Findings and 
Conclusions, 1fl[40-43 (R. 2086); Int. Trial Exh. 24. Victor Lawrence's involvement in the 
conspiracy to defraud Intermountain began more than a year before he appeared in the underlying 
case as attorney for the Schwenkes, Cindy Lawrence, Wong, and himself. 
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If an attorney conspires with others to defraud a third person and then, thereafter 
undertakes to represent his co-conspirators as well as himself in a civil action, it is easy to see 
how he, as an attorney, could use his knowledge of civil procedure to buy time and protect the 
object of the conspiracy. The trial court found that Victor Lawrence did just that after he entered 
his appearance on behalf of alleged co-conspirators, and engaged in a delaying action that 
bought months more additional time in which the Schwenkes, or their relatives, continued to use 
and drive the black and green Rodeos for free. Findings and Conclusions, f^l[31-32, 66 (R. 2085, 
2093); Supp. Findings and Conclusions, at 29-33 (R. 2526-2530). 
F. Each Party to a Civil Conspiracy to Defraud is Liable for All Damages that 
Result from the Underlying Fraud. 
A plaintiff is entitled to recover all damages that flow from a civil conspiracy. 15A C.J.S. 
Conspiracy § 44 (2002). Furthermore, each member of the conspiracy is liable for all damages 
resulting from the object of the conspiracy. Id., § 18; Brown v. Birman Managed Care, Inc., 42 
S.W.3d 62, 67 (Term. 2001). According to the Restatement, "one who accomplishes a particular 
consequence is as responsible for it when accomplished through directions to another as when 
accomplished by himself." Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 877, comment (a) (1979). If 
Intermountain's damages caused by Wayne Wong were, as the trial court found, $138,267.15 as 
of August 13, 2007 (including prejudgment interest), R. 2160, then each conspirator is liable, as 
is Wong, for damages in that amount. 
The Lawrences do not appeal the measure of damages against each of them for conspiracy 
to defraud. 
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2. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT CINDY LAWRENCE 
HAD KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONSPIRACY TO DEFRAUD 
INTERMOUNTAIN, AND WAS A PARTY TO THE CONSPIRACY BASED IN 
PART ON HER JUDICIAL ADMISSION. 
Cindy Lawrence claims on appeal that the trial court erred in finding that she had 
knowledge of the plan and conspiracy to defraud Intermountain given that the court's findings 
and conclusion was [she alleges] based solely on her "judicial admission, and where the evidence 
clearly indicates she had no actual knowledge" of the conspiracy or the inducement of $10,000 
promised to Wong if he would sign lease agreements in his personal capacity. Appellant's Brief, 
at 23. The "judicial admission" to which Cindy Lawrence refers is [^41 of her Complaint (R. 9), 
in which Cindy Lawrence and the other plaintiffs, including Wayne Wong, stated that "In order 
to induce plaintiff Wayne Wong to sign the leases, plaintiffs agreed to pay him $10,000." See 
Findings and Conclusions | 9 (R. 2081). This statement, if Cindy Lawrence is bound by it, 
establishes Cindy Lawrence's knowledge of a plan to compensate Wong to sign lease agreements 
for three new Isuzu Rodeos that would be used and driven by the Schwenkes and the Lawrences; 
under circumstances where neither Wong (notwithstanding his contractual commitment) nor the 
other plaintiffs intended to make the monthly lease payments. 
The Complaint also stated, as fact, that plaintiffs, who included Cindy Lawrence, 
understood and intended that the black Rodeo was "Cindy's car," Complaint, 1fl[34(4) and 35(3) 
(R. 6, 7). This is a fact material to Intermountain's fraud and conspiracy to defraud claims 
because Wayne Wong presented himself to Intermountain as the lessee of the vehicles, without 
disclosure that one of the vehicles, instead, was intended for Cindy Lawrence's personal use; and 
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without disclosure that neither he nor Cindy Lawrence intended to make the lease payments on 
the black Rodeo that later came due. 
A. Parties, Including Plaintiffs, are Bound by Judicial Admissions. 
According to the Utah Supreme Court, "an admission of fact in a pleading is a judicial 
admission and is normally conclusive on the party making it." Baldwin v. Vantage Corporation, 
676 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1984) (citing to Yates v. Large, 585 P.2d 697 (Ore. 1978.) "A 
statement of fact in a party's pleading is an admission that the fact exists as stated." Moore v. 
Drennan, 523 P.2d 1250, 1252-53 (Ore. 1974). According to 71 CJ.S. Pleadings § 90 (2000): 
The allegations in the pleadings are admissions against the party making them. 
Moreover, the allegations, statements, or admissions contained in a pleading are 
conclusive against the pleader. 
According to the Iowa Supreme Court, "Averments in a pleading * * * not withdrawn or 
superseded are conclusive admissions of the facts pleaded." Hansen v. Lassek, 154 N.W.2d 
871, 872 (Iowa 1967) (emphasis is added). Statements of fact contained in pleadings are 
"judicial admissions and, as such, cannot later be contradicted by the party who has made 
them." Tops Apparel Manufacturing Co. v. Rothman, 244 A.2d 436, 438 (Pa. 1968) (emphasis 
added). "As to such admissions, there is no issue; no proof is required; and the party making 
them is bound thereby." Hanson, 872. It follows that a party cannot subsequently take a position 
contradictory to her pleadings, and 
that the facts which are admitted by the pleadings are to be taken as true against the 
pleader * * *, whether or not they are offered as evidence. 
Hanson v. Lassek, 154 N.W.2d at 873; see also 71 CJ.S. Pleading § 90 (2000). 
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B. Cindy Lawrence is Bound by the Statements of Fact in her Complaint. 
The Complaint identifies Cindy Lawrence as a plaintiff. Thus, the statement at f41 is 
properly attributed to Cindy Lawrence. As a statement in a pleading, the statement at f41 was a 
judicial admission by Cindy Lawrence to which she was conclusively thereafter bound and was 
not at liberty, at trial, to contradict. The trial court, absent good reason to relieve Cindy Lawrence 
of her admission, was entitled to rely on the statement as an admission, as was Intermountain. 
C. Cindy Lawrence did not Give the Trial Court Good Reason to Relieve her of her 
Admission in the Complaint. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Baldwin observed that, "the court may relieve a party from 
the consequences of a judicial admission." Baldwin, 415 (emphasis added). There is, however, 
no requirement that it do so, especially where there is no good reason to do so. 
(1). Cindy Lawrence did not amend her Complaint to delete 
141. 
One way in which a party may distance itself from a statement made in a pleading is to 
amend her pleading; upon which the statement remains admissible as evidence against the party 
who made it, but is no longer conclusive against the party who made it. According to Yates v. 
Large, the Oregon case which the Utah Supreme Court cited in Baldwin, "Upon the filing of an 
amended answer . . . any admission of fact in the superseded answer is no longer a judicial 
admission, but is admissible as evidence to establish plaintiffs case." Yates, 585 P.2d at 700; 
see also 71 CJ.S. Pleading § 91 (2000). 
Seven years, however, lapsed between May 2000, when the Complaint was filed, and the 
first trial in this case, without any of the plaintiffs moving to amend their initial pleading. Victor 
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Lawrence, in his capacity as an attorney, entered an appearance on his wife's behalf on June 4, 
2001, R. 717, undertaking her representation as the case stood at the time. In entering an 
appearance on behalf of Cindy Lawrence, his wife, Victor surely must have obtained and showed 
to her the Complaint that identified her as a plaintiff, and disclosed to her the allegations ascribed 
to her therein. Cindy Lawrence was shown a copy of the Complaint by Intermountain's counsel, 
if not earlier by Victor Lawrence or Jamis Johnson, when Intermountain deposed her on March 
20, 2002; so clearly she had knowledge of the Complaint and its content by no later than March 
20, 2002. Yet, over the next five years, and even though represented by her husband for much of 
that time, she did not move to amend her Complaint. 
According to Yates, as would be the case in Utah, "whether to permit a party to file an 
amended pleading is ordinarily a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court." Yates, 585 
P.2d 700. The gravity and consequence of her judicial admission finally having become apparent, 
Cindy Lawrence moved to amend her Complaint, by which she sought to delete | 4 1 . However, 
she waited until trial and closing argument to do so. Findings and Conclusions, ^59 (R. 2091). 
By that time, Intermountain had introduced the Complaint into evidence (Int. Trial Exh. 31); 
Intermountain had relied on the statement at [^41 to establish its claim against Cindy Lawrence 
for conspiracy to defraud, Trial Brief at 13 (R. 1961, 1973), Tr. 5-6 (6/04/07), Tr. 479:8-23 
(6/08/07); and Judge Lindberg had identified Cindy Lawrence's judicial admissions made in her 
Complaint as part of her reason for denying Cindy Lawrence's motion to dismiss made at the 
close of Intermountain's case, Tr. 301-302 (6/05/07). In denying Cindy Lawrence's belated 
motion to amend, the trial court observed, in part, as follows: 
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^59 Cindy Lawrence's Motion to Amend Pleadings per Rule 15(b). At closing 
argument, Ms. Lawrence's counsel moved to amend the pleadings so as to alter 
the effect of her prior judicial admissions. Specifically, Ms. Lawrence sought to 
amend paragraph 41 of the original complaint that stated "[I]n order to induce 
plaintiff Wayne Wong to sign on the leases, plaintiffs agreed to pay him 
$10,000.00." Under Rule 15(b), when issues not addressed in the pleadings are 
tried by express or implied consent, amendment may be made to conform to the 
evidence. Those circumstances are not applicable here. 
• * * 
Additionally, this case has been pending since 2000, yet it was not until the Court 
noted that the allegations in the complaint were judicial admissions admissible 
against Ms. Lawrence, that she sought to amend the complaint to eliminate the 
effect of that admission. Ms. Lawrence has been represented by counsel at every 
stage of these proceedings, and either she or her counsel knew, or should have 
known, that Intermountain was relying on that statement in the complaint as 
support for its claims against her. Notwithstanding that knowledge, Ms. Lawrence 
waited until the last possible minute to challenge this particular admission. For all 
these reasons, the Court denies Ms. Lawrence's motion to amend the pleadings. 
Findings and Conclusions, [^59 (R. 2090). As the trial court denied Cindy Lawrence's last minute 
motion to amend her Complaint, she remained bound to the statements of fact and judicial 
admissions therein. It should be noted that Cindy Lawrence has not appealed the trial court's 
denial of her "last minute" motion to amend her Complaint. 
(2). The trial court did not believe and dismissed Cindy 
Lawrence's protestations that she knew nothing of the 
Complaint and the allegations therein, and that she did not 
authorize the Complaint to be filed on her behalf. 
Cindy Lawrence, in a desperate effort at trial to disassociate herself from f41 and other 
"admissions" in the Complaint, testified that she did not know a Complaint had been filed on her 
behalf in May 2000, that she had never read the Complaint, that she had not retained or 
authorized attorney Jamis Johnson to represent her, and that, prior to trial she had not known 
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what the Complaint said. Her testimony as to such things, first, does not establish their truth. A 
trial court is free to disregard the testimony of a witness. In fact, Rule 52(a), Utah R. Civ. P., 
states that "findings of fact . . . shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." 
Emphasis added. The trial court did not believe Cindy Lawrence's testimony, and explicitly said 
so in its Findings of Facts: 
Notwithstanding this judicial admission [referring to [^41 of the 
Complaint], at trial Ms. Lawrence denied any knowledge of, or 
participation in, the payment offered to Mr. Wong . . . . 
Throughout the trial, Ms. Lawrence's testimony was vague and 
inconsistent. As a result, the Court does not find Ms. Lawrence's 
testimony credible. 
Findings of Fact, | 9 (R. 2081). According to 1J59 of the trial court's Conclusions of Law: 
This Court rejects Ms. Lawrence's argument that all of the 
evidence at trial showed she knew nothing of the $10,000 promised 
to Mr. Wong. 
R. 2090. Also according to the trial court: 
In testifying at trial, Ms. Lawrence seemed to have little regard for the truth, in 
that her testimony contradicted statements she had made in her Complaint, her 
sworn statements in answers to interrogatories filed September, 2001, her sworn 
testimony when deposed in 2002, and even testimony given during trial. 
Supp. Findings and Conclusions, at 39 (R. 2536). 
The fact that the trial court found Cindy Lawrence's testimony on the above issues not to 
be credible, and it did not believe Mrs. Lawrence's protestations, see ffl[9 and 59 of the Court's 
Findings and Conclusions, distinguishes this case from Malpica v. Sebastian, 99 111. App 3d, 425 
N.E.2d 1029 (1981) (cited at p. 25 of Appellant's Brief) (in which the trial court expressly found 
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that there had never in that case existed an attorney-client relationship between the defendant and 
the attorney who had drafted the Answer in question). 
(3). Cindy Lawrence Ratified the Complaint. 
At trial, Cindy Lawrence had just testified, under oath, that the very first time she had 
seen Int. Trial Exh. 31, her original Complaint containing f41, was "yesterday," j u n e 5, 2007, 
when she had been shown it while testifying. Tr. 345-346 (6/06/07). She had also just testified 
that she had not known that she was a plaintiff in a civil action by virtue of the Complaint that 
named her as a plaintiff. Tr. 345:16-19 (6/06/07). 
In the subsequent cross-examination by Intermountain's attorney, Cindy Lawrence 
acknowledged she had been deposed on March 20, 2002. The deposition transcript, which was 
received as Int. Trial Exh. 91, indicates that Cindy Lawrence was shown the original Complaint 
on March 20, 2002, when she was deposed. (Deposition Transcript, Cindy Lawrence Depo., Int. 
Trial Exh. 91 at 20.) The fact that Cindy Lawrence was shown a copy of the original Complaint 
when she was deposed on March 20, 2002, first, establishes the untruthfulness of her just 
completed testimony that she had first seen a copy of the original Complaint only the day before, 
on June 5, 2007. Intermountain's attorney then read into the trial record Cindy Lawrence's 
answer to a question asked in the course of the deposition by her co-conspirator, A. Paul 
Schwenke. It was Schwenke, in the March 20, 2002 deposition who asked: 
Schwenke: So even though you have never seen this Complaint 
before as testified, this would have been the cause 
of action you would have asserted and in fact would 
have supported and consented for, is that correct? 
Your answer? 
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Cindy Lawrence, on March 20, 2002, answered: 
C. Lawrence: Yes. 
Tr. 349:18-25 (6/06/07). At trial, Intermountain also confronted Cindy Lawrence with her prior 
deposition testimony in response to a question asked at the deposition by her husband/attorney, 
Victor Lawrence, who, first noting that A. Paul Schwenke had signed the original Complaint 
under oath and that he, Victor Lawrence, had notarized Schwenke's signature verifying that the 
allegations in the Complaint were true, asked: 
V. Lawrence: Did you have any reason to dispute that Mr. 
Schwenke was lying in this document?4 
To which Cindy Lawrence responded: 
C. Lawrence: No. 
Tr. 350:1-351:8. Then, apparently trying to distance herself from her prior deposition testimony, 
Cindy Lawrence volunteered "But I did not read it that day, either, I looked at it. I didn't read it. 
* * * Which I wish I had." Tr. 351:9-12 (6/06/07). 
Cindy Lawrence on March 20, 2002, when deposed, thus ratified the statements attributed 
to her in the original Complaint, as a plaintiff. Cindy Lawrence, on March 20, 2002, was readily 
willing to endorse the content of the original Complaint even if she, as she later testified on June 
6, 2007, [maybe] never actually read the original Complaint, which identified her as a plaintiff. 
4Intermountain believes that Lawrence meant to ask his wife if she had any reason to 
dispute that Schwenke was "telling the truth" and that this is how Cindy Lawrence interpreted his 
question, in answering it. 
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Cindy Lawrence now contends on appeal that she ratified only "the cause of action" 
asserted in the Complaint, but not the precise statements and allegations made in the Complaint. 
Appellant's Brief, at 24. She did not make this argument at trial. Morever, how can she now 
claim that she was, by her testimony in March 2002, endorsing only the "cause of action" stated 
by the Complaint but not particular statements and allegations made therein, if she (as she 
testified on June 6, 2007) had not before read the Complaint? Moreover, it is a distinction 
without significance. The allegation at ^[41, which goes to Cindy Lawrence's knowledge of the 
monetary inducement promised to Wong, is part of the "cause of action" stated by her 
Complaint. 
The court did not err in concluding that Cindy Lawrence, by her testimony on March 20, 
2002, ratified the Complaint and the statements therein. The trial court's conclusion as to 
ratification, furthermore, is supported by Cindy Lawrence's failure, despite being represented by 
her husband for a significant portion of the time between her deposition and trial, to move to 
amend the original Complaint in order to omit Cindy Lawrence as a plaintiff or to delete 1J41. 
3. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN IMPUTING 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONSPIRACY TO VICTOR LAWRENCE BECAUSE 
OF HIS MARRIAGE TO CINDY LAWRENCE. 
Victor Lawrence claims on appeal that the trial court erred in imputing to him knowledge 
of the conspiracy involving his wife and Wayne Wong, because he was married to her at the 
time. 
First, the trial court did not err in drawing certain inferences from the fact that Victor and 
Cindy were married, especially given Cindy's participation in purchasing the vehicle and her and 
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Victor's subsequent free use of the black Rodeo. A conspiracy "may be inferred from 
circumstantial evidence, including the nature of the act done, the relations of the parties, and 
the interests of the alleged conspirators." Israel Pagan, 791 (emphasis added). 
Second, Victor Lawrence's marriage to Cindy Lawrence was only one of several factors 
that the trial court considered in inferring that Victor Lawrence, too, participated in the 
conspiracy and, in particular, knew of the general plan as well as the monetary inducement 
promised to Wong. See Findings and Conclusions, |65 (R. 2092) (stating a list of reasons other 
than marriage, identified as "a" through "e," why the trial court concluded that Victor Lawrence 
conspired with others to defraud Intermountain): 
Conspiracy to Defraud. . . . the Court concludes that Mr. Lawrence conspired to 
defraud Intermountain. The following facts point to Mr. Lawrence's knowing 
and intentional participation in the fraud: (a) Approximately one month 
before Mr. Lawrence obtained possession of the Black Rodeo, West Valley 
Dodge repossessed a Durango from the Lawrences that had been leased by 
Mr. Schwenke under a similar arrangement, (b) Shortly thereafter, Mr. 
Lawrence assisted Mr. Schwenke in his efforts to secure a new vehicle by 
contacting a Bountiful dealership, and attempting to negotiate a new set of 
leases, (c) Mr. Lawrence was present at the negotiations the day Mr. Wong 
signed the leases and knew the general financial terms of the leases. Mr. 
Lawrence even testified that at one point he told Mr. Schwenke to go back to 
the Bountiful dealership if Intermountain could not meet the terms offered 
by that dealership, (d) Mr. Lawrence provided the down payment for each of 
the three Rodeos, (e) Mr. Lawrence took possession of the Black Rodeo with 
no intent or expectation to pay for the vehicle, and without ensuring that 
payment would be made, (f) Because Mr. and Ms. Lawrence were married and 
cohabiting at the time Ms. Lawrence participated in the inducement to Mr. Wong, 
it is reasonable to infer that Mr. Lawrence was also aware of that inducement. The 
Court thus concludes that on the day Mr. Wong signed the leases at 
Intermountain, Mr. Lawrence was fully aware of, and intentionally participated in, 
the scheme to obtain and use vehicles without intent to pay for their use. As a 
result of Mr. Lawrence's participation in the scheme, he benefitted personally to 
the detriment of Intermountain. Intermountain suffered actual and substantial 
42 
financial damage from this fraudulent scheme. The Court holds that Mr. Lawrence 
was also a knowing and intentional participant in the fraud perpetrated by Mr. 
Schwenke and Mr. Wong. 
R. 2092 (emphasis added). As to (a)-(f), Lawrence argues on appeal that none of these acts or 
instances involve wrongful conduct. Appellant's Brief, at 18-19. His argument misses the point. 
The point is not that (a)-(f) involve wrongful conduct, but that from such conduct and facts it can 
reasonably be inferred that Lawrence knew of the $10,000 inducement offered to Wong to sign 
the leases in his personal capacity, and the plan to obtain from Intermountain new vehicles for 
the Schwenkes' and Lawrences' personal use without paying for them. 
Third, Victor Lawrence's knowledge of the allegations in the original Complaint, 
including f 41, at the time the original Complaint was filed, may be inferred from the fact that 
Victor Lawrence notarized Paul Schwenke's signature on the original Complaint. Int. Trial Exh. 
31; R. 1, 10. As such, Victor Lawrence was aware of the Complaint's existence on May 25, 
2000. It is incredulous that Victor Lawrence would, as an attorney, notarize the signature of a 
disbarred attorney to a Complaint that identified his wife as a plaintiff without reading the 
content of the Complaint. Victor Lawrence's knowledge of the original Complaint and the 
allegations therein may also be inferred from the fact that Lawrence and Jamis Johnson, at the 
time, were co-counsel on another case in which Paul Schwenke, Mrs. Schwenke, and Cindy 
Lawrence were parties, see Int. Trial Exh. 24 (Complaint dated March 30, 2000), and that Jamis 
Johnson was the attorney of record on the original complaint filed in this action. Clearly, Victor 
Lawrence at the time collaborated with Jamis Johnson on pleadings that involved his wife, 
Cindy, and the Schwenkes. 
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Finally, in making this argument on appeal, Victor Lawrence either forgets or 
intentionally chooses not to disclose that he made the very same admission in the course of 
a pleading he prepared, and filed with the district court on June 5, 2001. R. 738. Lawrence, 
as attorney representing himself as well as all parties then joined (who by now included Paul 
Schwenke and Victor Lawrence), stated as follows at p. 13,1J37 of a pleading he titled "Answer, 
Second Counterclaim, and Second Third Party Complaint:" 
Additionally, in order to induce WW to sign on the leases, buyers, 
VL and APS agreed to pay WW $10,000.00, $7,500.00 of which 
had already been paid and $2,500 is still owing . . . . 
R. 750 (throughout this pleading and at f 37, above, Lawrence refers to the parties by their 
initials, using "WW" for Wayne Wong; "VL" for Victor Lawrence, "APS" for A. Paul 
Schwenke; and "CL" for Cindy Lawrence).5 This statement, which is an admission by Victor 
Lawrence, as a party, in the course of a pleading that he, as an attorney, prepared, affirmatively 
alleges that he and Paul Schwenke agreed to pay Wong $10,000 in order to induce Wong to sign 
the lease agreements. This admission, by Victor Lawrence, corroborates the trial court's 
finding of fact that Victor Lawrence, too, knew about and participated in the agreement and plan 
to pay Wong $10,000 if he would sign leases for three new vehicles, which Wong did under false 
pretenses. It also reveals Victor Lawrence's duplicity. 
5This June 2001 pleading, incredibly, given Cindy's subsequent "know nothing, knew 
nothing, did not know anything about it" testimony at trial, actually states that the three original 
plaintiffs other than Wong, who included Cindy Lawrence, "were to each be responsible for the 
monthly payments on the vehicle in her possession." R. 741, f 7. 
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The trial court did not commit reversible error in inferring that Victor Lawrence had 
knowledge of the plan, including the agreement to offer and pay Wong $10,000 if he would sign 
lease agreements and promise to make the monthly lease payments that were due thereon, based 
in part on Victor Lawrence's marriage to Cindy Lawrence. 
4. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT VICTOR 
LAWRENCE AND CINDY LAWRENCE WERE LIABLE TO 
INTERMOUNTAIN FOR CONVERSION OF THE BLACK RODEO. 
A. Elements of Conversion, 
Conversion is the "willful interference with a chattel done without lawful justification by 
which the person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and possession." Phillips v. Utah State 
Credit Union, 811 P.2d 174, 179 (Utah 1991). Although conversion "results only from 
intentional conduct it does not, however, require conscious wrongdoing, but only an intent to 
exercise dominion or control over the good inconsistent with the owner's right." Id A person 
may be found liable for conversion of personal property even where he believes - or says he 
believed that he had a right to possess the item of personal property in question, if, in fact, he did 
not. See Mahana v. Onyx Acceptance Corp.. 2004 UT 59, 96 P.3d 893; Lake Philgas Service v. 
Valley Bank & Trust Co.. 845 P.2d 951 (Utah App. 1993). 
B. Intermountain had Standing to Assert a Claim for Conversion Against 
Victor and Cindy Lawrence for their Unauthorized Use of the Black Rodeo 
from April 1, 2000 to January 31, 2001, as Assignee of Bank of America's 
Rights. 
Victor and Cindy Lawrence contend on appeal that because Bank of America owned the 
black Rodeo from April 1, 2000 until January 31, 2001, Intermountain cannot therefore be 
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entitled to recover damages based on Mr. and Mrs. Lawrences' use and conversion of the black 
Rodeo from April 1, 2000 to January 31, 2001. Appellants' Brief at 27-28. Intermountain does 
not recall that the Lawrences made this argument to the trial court. Nonetheless, the argument is 
unpersuasive. 
(1). Bank of America assigned to Intermountain all its rights 
that concerned the black Rodeo and Wong's lease of the black 
Rodeo which, implicitly, included any cause of action Bank of 
America had against the Lawrences for conversion. 
Having received no lease payments for months, and Wong and other plaintiffs having in 
their Complaint contended that the lease agreements were void, Bank of America demanded that 
Intermountain repurchase the black Rodeo and Bank of America's rights under its lease 
agreement, which Intermountain did on January 31, 2001. See Int. Trial Exh. 61 (assignment by 
Bank of America to Intermountain of its rights, and transfer of its ownership of the black Rodeo); 
Trial Exh. 62 (Intermountain's check to Bank of America in the sum of $35,278.24); Trial Exh. 
63 (certificate of title endorsed by Bank of America to Intermountain); Findings and 
Conclusions, Tf25 (R. 2084). 
As the assignee of Bank of America's rights, Intermountain is entitled to recover of the 
Lawrences damages for their conversion, i.e., their unauthorized use and possession of the black 
Rodeo for the ten month period prior to January 31, 2001. The Assignment executed by Bank of 
America assigned to Intermountain "all of its right, title and interest in the Lease Agreement... 
and the Leased Vehicle." Int. Trial. Exh. 61. According to the Indiana Court of Appeals: 
As a general rule, a valid and unqualified assignment operates to 
transfer to the assignee all the right, title, or interest of the assignor 
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in or to the property or property rights that are comprehended 
within the terms of the assignment. Such transfer confers a 
complete and present right in the subject matter to the assignee. 
Rasp v. Hidden Valley Lake, Inc., 519 N.E.2d 153, 158 (Ind. App. 1988). Bank of America sold 
and assigned to Intermountain "all rights" related to the black Rodeo. "All rights" would include 
claims that belonged to Bank of America prior to January 31, 2001 for the Lawrences' 
unauthorized use and possession of the black Rodeo. 
(2). The Lawrences5 argument on appeal that Intermountain 
lacked standing to allege against them a cause of action for 
conversion because that cause of action belonged instead to 
Bank of America, is an affirmative defense that the Lawrences 
waived by not pleading it. 
In its First Amended Answer, Counterclaim, and Third-party Complaint filed May 7, 
2001 (R. 526), Intermountain disclosed that it had repurchased from Bank of America the black 
Rodeo and obtained an assignment of Bank of America's rights. f39 (R. 533). Intermountain 
pleaded a cause of action against the Lawrences for conversion, as Bank of America's assignee, 
for the Lawrences' unauthorized ten month possession of the black Rodeo, Victor Lawrence's 
interference with Intermountain's attempted repossession, and Victor Lawrence's delivery of the 
black Rodeo to A. Paul Schwenke. Answer/Counterclaim at 13-15 (R. 526, 538-40); see also 
TfP 1-32, 36, 39-43 of Intermountain's Answer/Counterclaim (R. 532-534). In response to 
Intermountain's pleading and stated cause of action for conversion, the Lawrences did not plead 
that Intermountain lacked standing to assert, as assignee of Bank of America's rights, the 
conversion claim Bank of America had for the Lawrences' unauthorized use of the black Rodeo. 
See Lawrences' and others' Answer (R. 738, 740-745). 
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"Lack of standing" to plead a certain cause of action is an affirmative defense. 61 
AmJur.2d Pleading §316 (1999). An affirmative defense that is not pleaded is waived. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 8(c) and 12(h); Golding v. Ashley Cent. Irr. Co.. 793 P.2d 897, 899 (Utah 1990) (failure 
to plead statutory immunity as an affirmative defense); Mabev v. Kay Peterson Constr. Co., 682 
P.2d 287, 289 (Utah 1984) (failure to plead mutual mistake as an affirmative defense); Bezner v. 
Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 548 P.2d 898, 901 (Utah 1976) (failure to plead waiver as an 
affirmative defense). 
C. The Lawrences, again, fail to Marshal the Facts and Arguments that 
Support the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and its Conclusion that Victor 
Lawrence and Cindy Lawrence were Each Liable in Conversion. 
Again, the Lawrences pick at selected issues and findings, and argue as they did below 
that they should not be found liable for conversion. They make no effort, though, to marshal the 
evidence that supports the trial court's findings of fact on conversion or its conclusion that Victor 
and Cindy Lawrence were liable in conversion. 
D. The Court's Findings of Fact Support its Conclusion that Victor 
Lawrence and Cindy Lawrence were Liable to Intermountain for 
Conversion. 
The trial court made detailed Findings of Fact, 1ffl2-43 (R. 2079), which, for the most 
part, the Lawrences ignore. The trial court, furthermore, in very specific fashion, stated its 
reasons for concluding, based on the facts it found, why Victor Lawrence was liable for 
conversion, f66 (R. 2093), and why Cindy Lawrence was liable for conversion, ^62 (R. 2092). 
See also, especially Findings of FactfU6-7,11-12, 19, 28-29 and 34 (R. 2080-2085). 
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Bank of America, not Wayne Wong and not Cindy or Victor Lawrence, owned the black 
Rodeo during the time period May 1, 2000 through January 31, 2001. As lessee, Wong had the 
right to possess the black Rodeo so long, but only so long as he made the monthly lease payments 
to Bank of America, according to the terms of his contract. See Int. Trial Exh. 1. Neither 
Victor nor Cindy Lawrence, though, had any right to possess and use the black Rodeo. Wong's 
contract with Bank of America prohibited Wong from assigning his interest in the lease or the 
vehicle, and he was not allowed to sublease the vehicle. Lease Agreement, general provision 16 
(at R. 49, 52); also Int. Trial Exh. 1. Moreover, Wong testified at trial that he did not authorize 
Victor or Cindy Lawrence's use of the black Rodeo. According to Wong, he never saw any of 
the leased vehicles after he signed lease agreements and he did not know who thereafter 
possessed them. 
The Complaint nonetheless identified the black Rodeo as "Cindy's car." Complaint, lfl[ 
34(4) and 35(3) ( R. 6-7). Plaintiffs' Answers to Interrogatories, dated October 17, 2000, also 
identified the black Rodeo as being "Cindy's car." Int. Trial Exh. 83, pp. 2-3. Cindy and Victor 
Lawrence used and drove the black Rodeo for ten months, although neither they nor Wong paid 
for its use. Cindy and Victor continued to drive it, despite the demands for payment made by 
Bank of America on co-plaintiff and co-conspirator Wayne Wong, see Int. Trial Exh. 20, which 
were ignored. It appears they intended to keep on using the black Rodeo - for free - until and 
unless someone with the right and means to do so took it from them. 
When Intermountain attempted to repossess the black Rodeo on January 31, 2001, it was 
in Victor Lawrence's possession, as he had driven it to work. Moreover, when Victor Lawrence 
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was confronted with the realization that Intermountain was trying to repossess the black Rodeo, 
he deliberately chose to deliver it to Paul Schwenke, even though the trial court found that he 
knew that Wong, not Schwenke, was the lessee. He did so, reasonably knowing that Schwenke 
intended not to surrender the vehicle to Intermountain or to Bank of America. In doing so, he 
interfered with Intermountain's legal right to take possession of the black Rodeo. See Utah Code 
§ 70A-2a-525 (as amended 1993).6 This act of interference with Intermountain's lawful right on 
January 31, 2001 to possession of the black Rodeo itself establishes a basis on which to hold 
Victor Lawrence liable for conversion, as the trial court did. Findings and Conclusions Tf| 28 and 
29 (R. 2084); Id., TJ66 (R. 2093). "A conversion may be based upon the unreasonable withholding 
of possession from one who has the right to possess it." Queen v. Lynch Jewelers, LLC, 55 P.3d 
914, 921 (Kan. App. 2002); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 237 (1965), which states 
that: 
One in possession of a chattel as bailee or otherwise who, on demand, refuses 
without proper qualification to surrender it to another entitled to its immediate 
possession, is subject to liability for conversion. 
6
 Victor Lawrence argued below, and argues in his Brief on appeal that Intermountain had 
no legal right to possess the black Rodeo until and unless armed with a court order or writ of 
replevin. See, Appellant's Brief at 28. His position is incorrect, as a Writ of Replevin or Court 
Order confirms a right to possession that exists before entry of a Writ or Order. Lawrence also 
argues that Intermountain could take possession of the black Rodeo only if it could do so without 
breaching the peace. Appellant's Brief at 28. In making this argument, Lawrence relies on Utah 
Code § 70A-9a-609(2), which applies to secured transactions, not leases. Finally, it was 
Lawrence who breached the peace, by physically attacking Mr. Watkins. 
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E. The Trial Court was Justified in Assessing Greater Damages against 
Victor Lawrence than Against Cindy Lawrence for Conversion. 
The trial court awarded to Intermountain compensatory damages in the sum of $3,625.40 
for Cindy Lawrence's conversion of the black Rodeo which, it explained, represented "the fair 
rental of the black Rodeo from April 1, 2000 to January 31, 2001 at $ 362.54" per month, plus 
prejudgment interest thereon. Findings and Conclusions, [^69 (R. 2094). It held Victor Lawrence 
jointly and severally liable for this amount of damages, for the same reason. Id. 
The trial court, in distinguishing Victor's conduct from Cindy's, held that Victor 
Lawrence's liability for damages caused by conversion was greater than Cindy's. It did so, first, 
because Victor Lawrence, on January 31, 2001, thwarted Intermountain's attempt to recover the 
black Rodeo and, thus, interfered with Intermountain's right to immediate possession of the 
vehicle, as its owner. Second, knowing that Intermountain had attempted to repossess the black 
Rodeo, and knowing that he had no right to its continued possession or use, Victor Lawrence 
gave the black Rodeo to Paul Schwenke (and not to Intermountain, Wayne Wong, or Bank of 
America) - who delivered the black Rodeo to his relatives in California, who also drove it 
without paying for its use until they totaled it in a single vehicle accident outside Compton, 
California. In distinguishing Victor Lawrence's conduct on and after January 31, 2001, the court 
concluded that the damages to be assessed against him, for conversion, were properly in the 
amount of $34,284.20, "representing Intermountain's cost to recover and purchase the black 
Rodeo less the $1,200 it recovered by selling it." Findings and Conclusions, 1fl[35, 66, 69 (R. 
2085, 2093-2094); see also Mahana, f 26 (holding that, "To the extent possible, the fundamental 
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purpose of compensatory damages is to place the plaintiff in the same position he would have 
occupied had the tort not been committed.)" 
Whether a trial court applied the correct rule for measuring damages is a question of law 
that an appellate court reviews for correctness. Mahana, TJ25. Victor Lawrence does not, on 
appeal, however, contend that the court's method of determining his damages for conversion was 
erroneous. See Appellant's Brief, Point 4 on conversion, at 27-30. Instead, the Lawrences' 
argument on appeal appears to be limited to whether Intermountain had standing to assert a claim 
against them for conversion, given that (1) Bank of America owned the black Rodeo from April 
1, 2000 to January 31, 2001, and (2) that Intermountain, allegedly, breached the peace when it 
tried to repossess the black Rodeo on January 31, 2001. 
5. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN IMPOSING ON VICTOR AND CINDY 
LAWRENCE PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
Utah Code § 78B-8-201(l) (formerly codified at § 78-18-1) provides: 
Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages may 
be awarded only if compensatory or general damages are 
awarded and it is established by clear and convincing evidence 
that the acts or omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of 
willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or 
conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference 
toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others. 
Subsection (2) of § 78B-8-201 provides that: 
Evidence of a party's wealth or financial condition shall be 
admissible only after a finding of liability for punitive damages 
has been made. 
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The commission of an intentional tort may warrant the imposition of punitive damages. 
Punitive damages thus may be awarded where the defendant is found liable for conversion, see 
Mahana v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 2004 UT 59; for fraud, see Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 
817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991); and for conspiracy to defraud, 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy § 45 (2002). 
The Court, following the trial in June, 2007, determined that the conduct of Victor 
Lawrence, Cindy Lawrence, and Wayne Wong warranted the entry of punitive damages, in 
addition to compensatory damages. See Findings and Conclusions, ^67. It thereafter scheduled 
and held a second trial, at which time it received evidence concerning the Lawrences' and Wayne 
Wong's financial situation, and other evidence concerning factors to be considered in assessing 
punitive damages. Following the second trial, the court awarded punitive damages against the 
three defendants in the following amounts: against Cindy Lawrence, in the sum of $99,999.99; 
against Victor Lawrence, in the sum of $484,000; against Wayne Wong, in the sum of 
$138,267.25. 
The trial court correctly premised its conclusion that punitive damages were warranted 
against Victor and Cindy Lawrence, on Utah Code § 78-18-1 (now § 78B-8-201). Findings and 
Conclusions, ff 53, 67, and 70 (R. 2088-2094); and Supp. Findings and Conclusions, Iffll and 21 
(R. 2499-2505). It made extremely detailed findings of fact following the second trial, see Supp. 
Findings and Conclusions, If 1-67 (R. 2498-2518). It considered and weighed the seven factors 
that the Utah Supreme Court, in Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange. 817 P.2d 789, 808 (Utah 
1991), held that trial courts should consider in determining what quantum of punitive damages is 
appropriate. See Supp. Findings and Conclusions, at 27-44 (R. 2524-2541). It analyzed, 
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separately, the conduct of each of the remaining defendants with reference to Crookston's seven 
factors. It acknowledged constraints on the amount of punitive damages to be awarded imposed 
by BMW of North America v. Gore, 217 U.S. 559 (1966) and defended its conclusions in light 
of, and by reference to Gore. Supp. Findings and Conclusions, at 26-27 (R. 2523-2524). 
The seven factors that a trial court must consider in determining the amount of punitive 
damages are, according to Crookston: (1) the relative wealth of the defendant; (2) the nature of 
the alleged conduct; (3) the facts and circumstances surrounding such conduct; (4) the effect 
thereof on the lives of the plaintiff and others; (5) the probability of future recurrence of the 
misconduct; (6) the relationship of the parties; and (7) the amount of actual damages awarded. 
No relative weights, however, are assigned or have been assigned to the seven factors. 
Crookston, 808. None of the factors are more conclusive or more important than another. 
Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89 ^ 49, reversed and remanded, 
538 U.S. 408 (2003). The seven factors are guidelines and not elements to be proven, and the 
absence of one of the factors in a given case does not mean that punitive damages are 
unwarranted. See e.g.. Hall v. Wal-Mart Stores, 959 P.2d 109 (Utah 1998) (plaintiffs failure to 
introduce any evidence concerning defendant's wealth did not preclude an award of punitive 
damages). "Whether punitive damages should be awarded is generally a question of fact within 
the sound discretion of the fact finder and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." 
Firkins v. Ruegner, 2009 UT App 167, 213 P.3d 895. 
Against the trial court's very deliberate approach to determining the appropriate measure 
of punitive damages to be awarded, and its detailed Supplemental Findings of Fact and 
54 
Conclusions of Law (R. 2498), the Lawrences, for the most part, simply restate the argument they 
made in their Trial Brief (R. 2426) and in their closing argument on March 11, 2008, Tr. 247-
253. They make no effort to marshal facts or argument that supports the trial court's decision 
that punitive damages were warranted, or that support the amount of punitive damages it 
concluded was appropriate. The Lawrences, for the most part, ignore the trial court's 
"Crookston analysis," R. 2524-2538, and instead re-argue the position they presented to the trial 
court. They, in effect, ask that the Court of Appeals close its eyes to the trial court's analysis and 
adopt the Lawrences' analysis instead. 
The Lawrences do argue that the court erred in imposing on them punitive damages for 
conspiracy to defraud Intermountain, because they could not be liable for conspiracy to defraud 
unless they, personally, misrepresented material facts to Intermountain on which it relied to its 
detriment. As the Lawrences' legal argument on this point is incorrect, their liability for 
conspiracy to defraud alone supports the trial court's award of punitive damages. 
The Lawrences argue that punitive damages against them, if affirmed, should be based 
only on conversion, and on compensatory damages in the amount of only $3,625.40 - the fair 
rental value of the black Rodeo for the ten months the Lawrences used and drove it. First, this 
argument is moot if the Court of Appeals affirms the trial court's findings and conclusion that the 
Lawrences were liable based on conspiracy to defraud which, the trial court found, caused 
Intermountain damages in the amount of $80,412.87, plus prejudgment interest in the amount of 
$57,854.38. Second, it ignores, as to Victor Lawrence, the greater amount of compensatory 
damages awarded against him for conversion, $34,284.20 plus prejudgment interest, because of 
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his forceful and unjustified interference on January 31, 2001 with Intermountain's effort to 
repossess the black Rodeo which, with Lawrence's subsequent delivery of the black Rodeo to 
Paul Schwenke, enabled Schwenke to spirit it off to California - where the vehicle was 
destroyed. See Findings and Conclusions, ffi[ 38-29, 31, 66, and 69 (R. 2084-2085, 2093-2094). 
6. THE PUNITIVE DAMAGES THAT THE TRIAL COURT AWARDED AGAINST 
VICTOR AND CINDY LAWRENCE WERE NOT EXCESSIVE, AND DID NOT 
VIOLATE EITHER OF THE LAWRENCES' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
A. The Court's Award of Punitive Damages Against Cindy Lawrence in the 
sum of $99,999.99 was Appropriate and Not Excessive. 
On August 10, 2007, the trial court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that 
found Cindy Lawrence liable to Intermountain for conspiracy to defraud, and for conversion. 
With regard to conspiracy to defraud, it found that Intermountain had sustained damages caused 
by Wong's fraud in the sum of $80,412.87, plus prejudgment interest in the sum of $57,854.38 
(R. 2160), for which Cindy Lawrence, as a conspirator, was also found liable. It found, 
separately, that Cindy Lawrence's conversion of the black Rodeo resulted in damages to 
Intermountain in the sum of $3,625.40, plus prejudgment interest. Following the second trial on 
punitive damages, the court entered judgment in Intermountain's favor, against Cindy Lawrence, 
for punitive damages in the amount of $99,999.99. R. 2498, 2541. 
The trial court's reason for awarding not more in punitive damages was based on a dearth 
of evidence at the second trial concerning Cindy Lawrence's wealth. According to Cindy 
Lawrence's testimony at the second trial she was not employed, had no assets, and kept no 
money in bank accounts, as she dealt in cash. Supp. Findings and Conclusions, at 37-38 (R. 
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2534-35). She claimed that she did not own, and had not owned, any interest in any businesses. 
Id. That testimony was proven not to be true. See Int. Trial Exhibit 103 (Articles of 
Organization for Lupus Lost, LC, designating Cindy Lawrence as a member; also identifying 
Cindy Lawrence as the manager of PCP, LC); Int. Trial Exhibit 115 (Articles of Organization for 
Hawaiian Investments, LC, designating Cindy Lawrence as "managing member"); trial 
testimony, Tr. 131-132 (3/11/08) (conceding, after first denying that she had any interests in any 
other businesses, that she had owned a 49% interest in a business called Rusty Roots, LC). 
Cindy Lawrence nonetheless insisted that, at least to her knowledge, none of these business 
entities had any assets, or income. 
If the punitive damages to be assessed against a particular defendant are under 
$100,000.00, and are less than three times the amount of compensatory damages, then the Utah 
Court of Appeals has held that it will be "presumed that the award of punitive damages is not 
excessive and no evidence of relative wealth is required to sustain the award." Bennett v. 
Hmsh, 2007 UT App 19 at 1J38 (emphasis added); see also Hall v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.. 959 
P.2d 109, 113 (Utah 1998) (holding that a plaintiffs failure to introduce any evidence concerning 
a defendant's wealth does not preclude an award of punitive damages). The lack of evidence 
concerning Cindy Lawrence's earnings and assets was, obviously, a reason why the trial court 
chose to award punitive damages in the amount of one cent less than $100,000.00. See Supp. 
Findings and Conclusions, at 37-38 (R. 2536). 
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B. The Court's Award of Punitive Damages Against Victor Lawrence in the 
sum of $484,000 was not Excessive. 
Before the Court of Appeals should consider reducing the trial court's award of punitive 
damages against Victor Lawrence, it should read and consider the trial court's findings and 
conclusions, which detail the reasons why the trial court concluded that an award of punitive 
damages against Victor Lawrence should equal three-and-one-half times compensatory damages. 
As to wealth, the second trial revealed considerable income received by Victor Lawrence in the 
years immediately preceding the trial, even though he had represented to the court just prior to 
trial that he was financially destitute, Lawrence's Trial Brief, at 4 (R. 2426, 2429). The trial court 
explained, carefully and in great detail, why Victor Lawrence's conduct, and his history of 
considerable income, justified a large award of punitive damages. See Supp. Findings of Fact, at 
2-3 and 29-37 (R. 2499-2500 and 2526-2534). 
(1). The Trial Court did not err in Considering Prejudgment 
Interest to be a Component of Compensatory Damages. 
The trial court recognized that punitive damages must bear a reasonable relationship to 
compensatory damages. Supp. Findings and Conclusions at 36, R. 2533 (citing Crookston v. Fire 
Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 808 (Utah 1991). The compensatory damages against which an 
award of punitive damages should be compared was, it concluded, $138,267.15 - a sum that 
included prejudgment interest. R. 2533. 
Victor Lawrence argues on appeal that the trial court erred in including prejudgment 
interest in compensatory damages, which becomes the denominator in any ratio that compares 
punitive damages to compensatory damages. Appellant's Brief at 31, 34; compare with trial 
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court's analysis, Supp. Findings and Conclusions at 24-25 (ffl[12-15) (R. 2521-2522), at 36 (R. 
2533), and at 44 (R. 2541). 
Lawrence relies on Campbell v. State Farm Ins. Co., 98 P.3d 409 (Utah 2004). In 
Campbell the Utah Supreme Court held that attorneys fees and costs should not be included in 
the denominator, with compensatory damages, to determine the ratio of punitive to compensatory 
damages. If they were to be included, that would allow a higher amount of punitive damages 
than would otherwise be the case, without exceeding the 3-to-l ratio above which, the Utah 
Supreme Court held in Crookston, is presumptively excessive. Prejudgment interest, though, 
differs in character and purpose from costs of court, and attorneys fees. The Utah Court of 
Appeals has held that, "Prejudgment interest represents an amount awarded as damages due to 
the opposing party's delay in tendering the amount owing under an obligation." Vasels v. 
LoGuidice, 740 P.2d 1375, 1378 (Utah App. 1987) (emphasis added). As damages, it is proper 
to include prejudgment interest in the denominator. Including prejudgment interest in the 
denominator in this case yields a punitive damages to compensatory damages ratio that is 
$484,000.00 / $138,267.25, which is a ratio of 3.5 to 1. 
(2). The Trial Court did not err in awarding Intermountain 
punitive damages against Victor Lawrence, which exceeded 
compensatory damages by a factor of 3.5 times. 
Punitive damages should bear a reasonable relationship to actual damages. Crookston v. 
Fire Insurance Exchange. 817 P.2d 789, 808 (Utah 1991). The Utah Supreme Court in the 
Crookston case, based on a review of Utah case law up to that time, established a general 
guideline concerning the appropriate ratio of punitive to compensatory damages. Crookston, 817 
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P.2d at 810. According to Crookston, a ratio of more than 3-to-l is presumptively excessive 
where the punitive damage award is less than $100,000. Where the punitive damage award is in 
excess of $100,000, the Supreme Court stated, "we have indicated some inclination to overturn 
awards having ratios of less than 3 to 1." The Supreme Court conceded, however, that up to that 
point in time, it had seldom been asked to review punitive damage awards greater than $100,000. 
Crookston, in any event, does not preclude an award of punitive damages in excess of the 
prior observed ratios, or a 3-to-l ratio, if warranted by the facts and circumstances in a particular 
case. In the Crookston case itself, the trial court on remand upheld an award of punitive damages 
in the amount of $4 million, which exceeded compensatory damages by a factor of 5. Crookston 
v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 860 P.2d 937 (Utah 1993) (affirming trial court's justification for awarding 
punitive damages 5 times the amount of compensatory damages). In Smith v. Fairfax Realty, 
2003 UT 41,1144-48, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's award of $5.5 million in 
punitive damages, which exceeded compensatory damages by a factor of 5.5 to 1. In Campbell v. 
State Farm, the Utah Supreme Court, on remand by the United States Supreme Court, determined 
that punitive damages of just over $9 million, equal to nine times compensatory damages, was 
appropriate. Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins., 2004 UT 34. 
A high ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages is not by itself determinative 
of excessiveness. Diversified Holdings, LC v. Turner, 2002 UT 129 at f24. Where, however, 
an award of punitive damages exceeds the presumptive guidelines observed in Crookston, a trial 
court judge "must make a detailed and reasoned articulation of the grounds for concluding that 
the award is not excessive in light of law and the facts." This articulation should generally be 
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couched in terms of one of more of the aforementioned seven factors "unless some other factor 
seems compelling to the trial court." Crookston, 817 P.2d at 811. An award that is 
presumptively excessive may be justified by an explanation of why the case is unique, usually in 
terms of one of the established seven factors." Bennett v. Huish, 2007 UT App. 19 at n. 11. 
The trial court in great detail explained why it believed an award of punitive damages 
against Victor Lawrence, equal to 3.5 times the amount of compensatory damages it awarded, 
was appropriate. See Supp. Findings and Conclusions, at 27-37 (R. 2524-2534). In so doing, 
the trial court discharged its duty to explain why this case justified a modest deviation from the 
3-to-l ratio set by Crookston as a guideline for courts to follow in determining when punitive 
damages become excessive. The trial court's explanation, furthermore, is well-founded and 
reasonable. 
(3). The Trial Court's award of punitive damages against 
Victor Lawrence in the sum of $484,000.00 did not violate his 
constitutional rights. 
Victor Lawrence cites to this court on appeal, as he did to the trial court (Tr. 247, 
3/11/08); Lawrence Trial Brief (R. 2426, 2427), BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 
(1996). He does not, however, explain why Gore requires or warrants a reduction in the amount 
of punitive damages that the trial court assessed against him. In fact, the Lawrences, in their 
Appellant's Brief at 37, mention Gore only in passing, then collapse to an analysis of six of the 
seven factors that Crookston identified as factors to be considered in determining the amount of 
punitive damages. Appellant's Brief at 37-41; compare to trial court's recognition and analysis 
of Gore and State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. v. Campbell 528 U.S. 408 (2003) in its Supp. Findings 
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and Conclusions at 26-27 (R. 2523-2524), and its analysis and application of the seven 
Crookston factors to Victor Lawrence's situation and conduct, Supp. Findings and Conclusions 
at 27-37 (R. 2524-2534). 
The seventh factor which Victor Lawrence declines to discuss, his wealth and 
considerable earnings, trace back to his sole ownership of the Lexington Law Firm, a "credit-
repair" law firm with 45,000 to 55,000 active clients in 2005; and his continued relationship with 
affiliated companies. See Supp. Findings and Conclusions, HJ7-42 (R. 2501-2511). Perhaps he 
avoids the issue of wealth, because the evidence at trial revealed that he was not telling the truth 
when he informed the trial court, prior to the second trial, that he had little income and was 
destitute. Lawrence Trial Brief, R. 2426, 2429. On the criterion of "wealth," the trial court 
found and observed as follows: 
It is difficult to determine with any exactness Mr. Lawrence's wealth, measured 
by assets or income, for the very reason that he has tried hard over the years to disguise 
and hide the amount and sources of his income, including from the Internal Revenue 
Service. Mr. Lawrence has also been less than candid concerning his assets and income. 
* * * 
Notwithstanding Mr. Lawrence's lack of candor, and notwithstanding his hollow 
protestations of poverty, it is apparent that he has since at least the early 2000s received 
substantial income, far and above what would be considered average annual income. In 
mid 2004, Mr. Lawrence's income approached $40,000/month, derived primarily from 
his ownership of the Lexington Law Firm. Far Cliffs Media and RevGen have, since 
sometime in 2005 or before, regularly and faithfully paid Lawrence $35,000 per month in 
consulting fees, which have continued at least through February, 2008. Lexington paid 
Lawrence additional sums for his consulting services, amounting to more than $200,000 
(or about $50,000 per year on average) since Lawrence ostensibly sold Lexington to John 
Heath in June, 2004. 
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In addition, Mr. Lawrence also owns at least one significant asset, consisting of 
software, the licensing of which has generated huge if unspecified royalty income to Mr. 
Lawrence. 
What is known about Mr. Lawrence's income and wealth, including his 
ownership of at least one asset of substantial value, warrants a significant award of 
punitive damages. 
Supp. Findings and Conclusions, at 28-29 (R. 2525-2526). It should be noted that the evidence 
at the second trial indicated that Lawrence, notwithstanding his pretrial protestation of 
adverse financial circumstances, had been regularly receiving income of $35,000 a month 
paid by Far Cliffs Media and RevGen, up to and including the month prior to trial. 
Lawrence also avoids any discussion of his role in thwarting Intermountain's recovery of 
the black Rodeo, in which he "without cause or justification, attacked Mr. Watkins, seizing him 
and grabbing him in a headlock," causing injury to Mr. Watkins, Supp. Findings and Conclusions 
at 2-3,11 (R. 2499-2500) and Int. Trial Exh. 106), which the trial court considered to be an 
aggravating factor that warranted a greater award of punitive damages. Id. at 30 (R. 2527). It was 
Lawrence's conduct and interference with Intermountain's right to possess the black Rodeo, on 
January 31, 2001, furthermore, that allowed Paul Schwenke to transport the vehicle out-of-state, 
where Schwenke's relatives drove it without paying for its use, until they destroyed it. 
The trial court's award of punitive damages against Victor Lawrence in the amount of $484,000 
was, in sum, not excessive, and did not violate Lawrence's constitutional right of due process. 
VIII. RELIEF ON APPEAL REQUESTED BY APPELLEE. 
Intermountain, Inc. requests that the Court of Appeals: 
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1. Affirm and uphold the judgments for compensatory damages awarded in favor of 
Intermountain against Victor Lawrence and Cindy Lawrence, as entered on August 13, 2007, 
including as amended on September 20, 2007 to include and add prejudgment interest. 
2. Affirm and uphold the judgments for punitive damages in favor of Intermountain 
against Victor Lawrence and Cindy Lawrence, as entered on June 25, 2008. 
3. Award Intermountain its costs on appeal. 
4. Implement disciplinary proceedings against Victor Lawrence, and potential 
disbarment. 
•k Dated: February ff -, 2010 
P. Bryan Fishburn 
Attorney for Intermountain, Inc. 
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INTERMOUNTAIN, INC., a Utah 
corporation, doing business as 
Intermountain Isuzu; and G. THOMAS 
WATKINS, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 020906142 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
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This matter came up regularly for trial on Wednesday, January 16, 2008 
pursuant to notice. The Plaintiff appeared through counsel, Blake S. Atkin, and the 
Defendants appeared through counsel or record, Wynn E. Bartholomew. Plaintiff 
Victor Lawrence (hereinafter "Lawrence") had made claims for damages for assault 
and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress and trespass to chattels 
against Defendants. Claims made by the Plaintiff for breach of the peace and, by 
implication, negligence relating to a breach of the peace were previously dismissed 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
Deputy Clerk 
by the court as a matter of law in a Memorandum Decision dated March 19, 2007 
Defendan t G Thomas W a t k m s (here inaf ter " W a t k m s " ) made cla im under a 
counterclaim against Plaintiff Lawrence for assault and battery seeking damages for 
injuries, pam and suffering, and emotional distress The Court took testimony from 
witnesses, heard the arguments of the parties, and considered various documents 
entered into evidence Based upon the foregoing, the Court now makes the following 
Findings ofFact 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 Watkms is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and an office, co-
owner, and agent of Defendant Intermountain, Inc , a Utah corporation licensed to do 
business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah as a motor vehicle dealer 
2 Lawrence is a resident of Davis County, State of Utah 
3 On or about March 31, 2000, Wayne Wong entered into a written lease 
a g r e e m e n t to lease a b lack Isuzu Rodeo ( h e r e i n a f t e r the " v e h i c l e " ) , VIN 
452DM58W7Y4302440, from Intermountain, Even though others may have negotiated 
and taken actual possession of said vehicle, the vehicle was leased to Wayne Wong 
4 Pursuant to said lease agreement, Wayne Wong did not have authority to 
sublease or grant permission to anyone except on a temporary basis to use said vehicle 
without the express permission of Lessor 
5 Although Lawrence testified that he and his family had permission to use said 
vehic le , his tes t imony was not credible There was no credible evidence that 
Lawrence, or his family, ever had permission to use the vehicle 
6 Wayne Wong was obligated by the lease agreement to make monthly lease 
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payments to Lessor in the amount of $364 52 Neither Wong nor Lawrence, nor anyone 
else acting on their behalf, ever made any monthly lease payment on said vehicle 
7 As a result, said written agreement was in default and the vehicle became 
subject to repossession by the Lessor 
8 Intermountam bought the vehicle back from Bank of America on January 31, 
2001, and had authority to repossess said vehicle as Lessor on that date 
9 Later on or about January 31, 2001, said vehicle was located by Watkms in 
a parking garage located in Salt Lake City, State of Utah 
10 Watkms and Duane Smith of Noorda Towing attempted to repossess said 
vehicle from the parking garage Prior to at tempting to repossess said vehicle, 
Watkms called Salt Lake City Police Department and attempted to notify them of his 
intent to repossess 
11 Said vehicle was secured by a lockbar owned by Lawrence immobilizing the 
steering wheel of said vehicle 
12 Access to the vehicle was gained by a duplicate key made by Watkms 
Watkms and Duane Smith were attempting to saw through the cylinder of said lockbar 
with a hacksaw when they were approached by Lawrence 
13 Lawrence asked Watkms and his agent what they were doing in the vehicle 
14 Lawrence entered the vehicle and seized personal property of Duane Smith 
and refused to return said personal property Lawrence asked Watkms and his agent 
to leave the vehicle, which they did 
15 Thereafter, Watkms attempted to retrieve Duane Smith's tools from the 
vehicle Without cause or justification, Lawrence attacked Watkms by seizing him and 
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grabbing his head in a headiock. During this altercation, Watkins' head and neck were 
injured, causing a cut to his head and bruise to the neck. 
16. Watkins suffered injuries to his head as a consequence of the attack by 
Lawrence. 
17. Watkins sustained damages as a result of said assault and battery. The court 
finds those damages to be in the sum of $10.00 because Mr. Watkins testified that was 
the amount of his co-pay. No further credible evidence was offered regarding the 
actual medical costs of Watkins ' injuries. 
18. Lawrence testified that he was the victim of a verbal and physical attack by 
Watkins, but his testimony was not credible, and was contradicted by the testimony 
of other witnesses including Mr. Watkins. 
19. Lawrence sustained no physical injury in the course of the altercation and 
incurred no medical bills as a result of the altercation. 
20. There was no credible evidence or testimony offered establishing the 
elements of an intentional infliction of emotional distress by Watkins on Lawrence. 
21. Lawrence did not present the lockbar as an exhibit and there was no credible 
evidence that it was damaged, and no evidence of the amount of damages assuming 
that it was. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters the following 
Conclusions of Law: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Jurisdiction and venue are proper. 
2. Watkins was authorized as an agent of Intermountain to repossess said 
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vehicle on January 31, 2001, and Intermountain was authorized to employ third parties 
to assist it in that endeavor. 
3. While engaged in attempting to repossess said vehicle, Lawrence, unlawfully 
and without legal justification, physically and verbally assaulted Watkins causing him 
bodily injury and harm. 
4.Watkins is entitled to an award of general and emotional damages on his 
counterclaim in the sum of $10.00. 
5. Lawrence failed to prove his claims for assault and battery, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and trespass to chattel and, therefore, these claims 
were dismissed with prejudice at the conclusion of the Plaintiff 's case, no cause of 
action. 
DATED: farmaTv O , 2008. 
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